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Despite widespread acclaim for their potential to reduce public health
harms, technological advances in health and safety frequently raise the
ominous specter of risk compensation behavior-the possibility that individuals
protected by these technologies will increase their risk-taking on the belief that
they are protected from harm. Risk compensation has been a rallying cry for
opponents of new technologies such as the HPV vaccine, needle exchange
programs for drug users, or prescription pills for the prevention of HIV
infection. Although these concerns are frequently voiced in the language of
morality and personal responsibility, it may be more productive to consider this
phenomenon through the lens of behavioral science, with an emphasis on
respecting individuals' behavioral preferences. This Article aims to present the
theoretical basis for risk compensation behavior, to categorize diferent types
of risk compensation effects, to enumerate ways in which the law may address
these effects, and to illustrate an application of these legal strategies to FDA
regulation of prescription drugs. Throughout, this Article reframes risk
compensation behavior as a presumptively rational mechanism for value
conversion, by which the protective value of a health or safety technology is
transformed into another type of value that may better satisfy individual
preferences. But where imperfect information or negative externalities lead to
harm, there may be a role for a regulatory response.
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Introduction
On July 16, 2012, the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) issued a




America."' The decision was to approve the antiretroviral drug Truvada@ for
use as pre-exposure prophylaxis (PrEP)-the first pill effective for reducing the
chance of acquiring human immunodeficiency virus (HIV) infection among
adults at high risk.2 Before issuing this approval, the FDA reviewed safety data
and two placebo-controlled trials demonstrating Truvada's efficacy for
preventing HIV.3 Scientists lauded the decision as a "major milestone,"4 policy
advocates hailed it as "a moment to celebrate,"s and policy experts suggested
that the approval "reinvigorat[es] the idea that we can reali[ze] an AIDS free
generation." 6 Where was the catastrophe? In denouncing the FDA's decision,
the AIDS Healthcare Foundation warned of side effects and potential missed
pills, but above all, the danger was "risk compensation, the phenomenon of
engaging in more risky behavior when you believe you're protected from
harm."7 If people taking Truvada as PrEP stop using condoms or have sex with
more partners, argued the Foundation's general counsel, PrEP "will actually
increase HIV infections. .. . [and] do more harm than good."8
Even without knowing the technical term "risk compensation," most of us
have heard of offsetting behavior in some form. We may fear giving liver
transplants to alcoholics, providing sterile needles to drug users, vaccinating
adolescent women to prevent human papillomavirus infection (HPV), or selling
statins as a fast food side dish-all on the rationale that these interventions may
increase the unhealthy behaviors that lead to future harm. Although these
arguments often play out through claims of morality, personal responsibility,
and fairness, there is indeed a scientific basis for concern about offsetting
effects, also called risk compensation behavior. This Article is primarily
concerned with what may be called "upward" risk compensation, by which
individuals take more risks based on the expectation that some intervention
(such as a bicycle helmet or a vaccine) has decreased their exposure to harm.
1. Bruce Geryk, Truvada Gets FDA Nod for HIV Prevention, ABC NEWS (July 16, 2012),
http://abenews.go.com/Health/AIDS/pill-prevent-hiv-fda-approval/story?id=16789790.
2. FDA, Questions and Answers on Emtricitabine 200 Mg/Tenofovir Disoproxil (Marketed as
Truvada), FDA.GOv (July 2012), http://www.fda.gov/Drugs/DrugSafety/PostmarketDrugSafety
InformationforPatientsandProviders/ucm312202.htm.
3. Id.
4. David Holmes, FDA Paves the Way for Pre-Exposure Prophylaxis, 380 LANCET 325, 325
(2012) (quoting Dr. Kenneth Mayer); Brian Vastag, FDA Approves First Drug to Prevent HIVInfection,
WASH. POST, July 17, 2012, at A03 (quoting FDA Commissioner Margaret A. Hamburg calling the
decision an "important milestone").
5. Mitchell J. Warren & Emily S. Bass, From Efficacy to Impact: An Advocate's Agenda for
HIVPre-Exposure Prophylaxis Implementation, 44 AM. J. PREVENTIVE MED. S167, S167 (2013).
6. Holmes, supra note 4, at 325 (quoting former White House policy advisor Gregorio
Millett).
7. Tom Myers, HIV Prevention Pill Will Do More Harm Than Good: The Side Effects of
Truvada PrEP Outweigh Its Benefits, As People Will Struggle To Take It Regularly, U.S. NEWS AND
WORLD REPORT, Aug. 3, 2012, http://www.usnews.com/opinion/articles/2012/08/03/hiv-prevention-
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But if we take a wider view, we can find offsetting behavior everywhere, not
only in unhealthy directions, but also in helpful ways, such as driving more
slowly on a foggy day, scheduling a mammogram after a close relative is
diagnosed with breast cancer, or skipping dessert on days when one does not
exercise. These behaviors are driven not necessarily by changes in our actual
risk, but rather by changes in our perception of risk-our feelings of health and
safety. Drawing on this dynamic, risk compensation theory suggests that it may
be dangerous to feel protected, possibly to the point where health interventions
might help us more if we had no idea we were getting them.
Past legal scholarship has engaged to some extent with risk compensation
theory. Much of this work has assessed unexpected responses to regulations
designed to have direct effects on behavior, such as seatbelt laws, 9 gun safe-
storage laws,' 0 protective bottle cap requirements for medications," and airbag
regulations in cars.12 Several articles have also examined the ways in which
consumers' risk compensation behavior can influence the effects of legal rules
intended to achieve other goals, such as promoting fuel efficiency,
safeguarding the right to obtain an abortion,14 or expanding insurance coverage
for the treatment of addictions' 5 or diabetes.' 6 Theoretical legal literature has
repeatedly expressed worries that risk compensation effects may undermine
health and safety regulation,' 7 but these behaviors have generally been viewed
as an "intractable" problem beyond reach of the law.'8 To date, very little work
has considered whether and how the law might intervene in risk compensation
dynamics.
9. See Sam Peltzman, The Effects of Automobile Safety Regulation, 83 J. POL. ECON. 677
(1975). Several commentators have referred to offsetting behavior as the "Peltzman effect" on the basis
of this study. See, e.g., Adam T. Pope & Robert D. Tollison, "Rubbin' Is Racin "': Evidence of the
Peltzman Effect from NASCAR, 142 PUB. CHOICE 507 (2010).
10. Cynthia Leonardatos, Paul H. Blackman & David B. Kopel, Smart Guns/Foolish
Legislators: Finding the Right Public Safety Laws, and Avoiding the Wrong Ones, 34 CONN. L. REV.
157 (2001); John R. Lott, Jr. & John E. Whitley, Safe-Storage Gun Laws: Accidental Deaths, Suicides,
and Crime, 44 J.L. & ECON. 659 (2001).
11. W. Kip Viscusi, The Lulling Effect: The Impact of Child-Resistant Packaging on Aspirin
and Analgesic Ingestions, 74 AM. ECON. REv. 324 (1984).
12. Steven Peterson, George Hoffer & Edward Millner, Are Drivers of Air-Bag-Equipped
Cars More Aggressive? A Test of the Offsetting Behavior Hypothesis, 38 J.L. & ECON. 251 (1995).
13. Paul E. Godek, The Regulation of Fuel Economy and the Demand for "Light Trucks", 40
J.L. & ECON. 495 (1997).
14. Jonathan Klick & Thomas Stratmann, The Effect of Abortion Legalization on Sexual
Behavior: Evidence from Sexually Transmitted Diseases, 32 J. LEGAL STUD. 407 (2003).
15. Jonathan Klick & Thomas Stratmann, Subsidizing Addiction: Do State Health Insurance
Mandates Increase Alcohol Consumption?, 35 J. LEGAL STUD. 175 (2006).
16. Jonathan Klick & Thomas Stratmann, Diabetes Treatments and Moral Hazard, 50 J.L. &
ECON. 519 (2007).
17. See infra Subsection I.C.





With the exception of a 2008 article discussing risk compensation as a
form of placebo effect,19 legal scholarship has not yet considered offsetting
behavior as a predictable consumer response to pharmaceutical products. In
overlooking the literature on risk compensation behavior, we disregard a
phenomenon that could undermine drug effectiveness, reduce cost-
effectiveness, and expose consumers to adverse health consequences. We may
also miss opportunities to minimize risk compensation behaviors, which could
increase the beneficial impact of new drugs. Prescription drugs are governed by
overlapping regimes of FDA regulation and tort liability for product defects,
providing many legal tools for addressing risk compensation behavior. FDA
approval and products liability law do more than regulate product availability-
they also require companies to create specific forms of knowledge about their
products and to make risks known to users. These legal requirements provide
opportunities both to identify risk compensation effects and to attempt to
mitigate them. Despite this potential, however, systems for approving and
marketing new drugs tend to obscure the behavioral evidence we need to
maximize their value; moreover, even when there is behavioral evidence of risk
compensation responses, the law is poorly equipped to address them.
This Article examines the relevance of risk compensation behavior to
FDA regulation of pharmaceutical products in the United States, particularly as
applied to the testing, approval, and marketing of prescription drugs.
Behavioral responses to medications are particularly important for drugs that
are partially efficacious: some of our best new weapons against chronic and
infectious illness are only partially efficacious, and improvements in health
must come from both technology and behavior change. This Article also
stresses that our understanding of risk compensation would benefit from a more
thorough engagement with behavioral science literature, which suggests that
such responses are both more complex and potentially more value-maximizing
than has previously been considered. In order to better understand risk
compensation behavior, we must acknowledge that individuals may perceive
value in activities that are labeled "risky." For instance, driving quickly, eating
junk food, drinking alcohol, and having unprotected sex may all confer
individual-level benefits, such as speed, pleasure, relaxation, social inclusion,
and relationship satisfaction. As a corollary, self-protective behaviors may
carry costs. For example, driving slowly increases travel time, eating
healthfully may be expensive, teetotaling may be socially burdensome
depending on one's peers, and protected sex may be less pleasurable.
Interventions that reduce risks, such as statins or high blood pressure
medications, may have side effects and financial costs. Risk compensation is a
mechanism by which individuals seek to capture the benefits that most accord
with their values, striking a balance between acceptable risks and desired
19. Anup Malani, Regulation with Placebo Effects, 58 DUKE L.J. 411,430 (2008).
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benefits. When risk compensation occurs, one's actual risk depends on two
separate independent variables: the use of a risk-reducing intervention, such as
a drug or vaccine, and the corresponding perception of risk-reduction, which
may lead the individual to adjust his behavior in a way that affects his and
others' risks. Although the two variables are related-an individual perceives
that his risks are lower because he is using a risk-reducing intervention-the
effects of these two variables are distinct.
Throughout this Article, pre-exposure prophylaxis (PrEP) drugs for the
prevention of HIV, such as the recently approved Truvada, will represent a case
study of an emerging pharmaceutical strategy to reduce risks posed by
individual health behaviors. PrEP refers to the use of antiretroviral drugs by
HIV-negative people, wherein people take the drugs before engaging in
behaviors that carry a risk of HIV infection, such as unprotected sex. Although
Truvada is partially efficacious for preventing infection;20 concerns about risk
compensation have complicated plans for dissemination of this new strategy.
This discussion proceeds in five Parts. Part I describes risk compensation
and its underlying theory of risk homeostasis, providing the first cross-
phenomenon review of the empirical evidence that supports and challenges this
model. Part II re-examines the extent to which risk compensation should be
regarded as an adverse effect: although increased risk-taking may diminish the
impact of health interventions, these behaviors also represent a fuller
expression of preferences that serve individual ends. If we respect an
individual's own preferences, someone may in fact obtain more overall benefit
from a preventive drug by a combination of some protection from disease and
some increased risk behavior, compared to retaining all the drug's preventive
benefits. Efforts to minimize risk compensation, then, are invariably efforts to
intervene in individual choice, which makes such proposals normatively
suspect. This Part will characterize several different types of risk compensation
effects-perfectly informed risk compensation, uninformed partial risk
compensation, uninformed overcompensation, and externally hazardous risk
compensation-and discuss the normative basis for using legal intervention to
minimize these effects. This Article is the first to take a trans-substantive view
of risk compensation behavior, as well as the first to offer a taxonomy to guide
regulatory efforts.
Identifying risk compensation effects, particularly hazardous effects, leads
naturally to the inclination to intervene in these processes. This impulse,
however, runs the risk of producing an overly coercive response, such as
barring product access or withholding product approval. Using FDA regulation
20. Jared M. Baeten et al., Antiretroviral Prophylaxis for HIVPrevention in Heterosexual Men
and Women, 367 NEW ENG. J. MED. 399 (2012); Robert M. Grant et al., Preexposure Chemoprophylaxis
for HIV Prevention in Men Who Have Sex with Men, 363 NEW ENG. J. MED. 2587 (2010); Michael C.
Thigpen et al., Antiretroviral Preexposure Prophylaxis for Heterosexual HIV Transmission in Botswana,




of prescription drugs as a test case, this Article describes several ways in which
the law might address offsetting, with increasing levels of intrusiveness:
identifying risk compensation effects, attempting to modify user behavior, and
only then considering limitations on product access. Part III argues that the
FDA should impose on drug manufacturers a legal duty to test for risk
compensation effects and associated health consequences, where preliminary
testing and scientific commentary suggest that risk compensation is possible.
Although risk compensation effects are not currently assessed in the FDA's
multiphase framework for drug approval, they should be a legally required part
of pre- and post-marketing testing. Part IV suggests ways in which FDA
regulation can address the behaviors of drug users, including product labeling
to warn intermediaries and consumers about possible risk compensation effects,
along with other components of FDA-approved Risk Evaluation and Mitigation
Strategies (REMS).
Finally, Part V assesses the role that risk compensation concerns might
play during the FDA approval process, including initial approval and
requirements for Phase IV testing. This Part argues that risk compensation
behavior should not by default bar initial FDA approval, nor should it lead to
the withdrawal of efficacious drugs from the market. To limit product access,
the threshold must be extraordinarily high: the FDA should consider this option
only when hazardous risk compensation effects are observed, where those
effects outweigh the public health benefit of the drug, and where efforts to
modify user behavior are unsuccessful. In this extreme and highly unlikely
scenario, efforts to limit access to such products may be normatively defensible
on public health grounds.
I. Risk Compensation and Risk Homeostasis Theory
Scientific understanding of risk compensation behavior is based on risk
homeostasis theory, first proposed by Professor Gerald J.S. Wilde in the 1970s,
and later refined by Professor John Adams and other scholars.21 The goal of
this Part is to describe the evidence base for risk compensation behavior,
outlining a behavioral mechanism by which individuals may adjust their risk-
taking in response to a preventive intervention. Sections within this Part will
describe the origins and processes of risk compensation behavior theory,
summarize evidence that supports and challenges this theoretical model, and
detail the ways in which legal scholarship has previously engaged with these
concepts.
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21. See, e.g., JOHN ADAMS, RISK 14 (1995); GERALD J.S. WILDE, TARGET RISK 2 (2001);
James Hedlund, Risky Business: Safety Regulations, Risk Compensation, and Individual Behavior, 6
INJURY PREVENTION 82, 82-84 (2000).
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A. Theoretical Basis
Activities that affect our health, safety, and security have both potential
22costs and expected benefits. Risk homeostasis theory posits that for every
activity, "people accept a certain level of subjectively estimated risk to their
health, safety, and other things they value, in exchange for the benefits they
hope to receive from that activity ([e.g.,] transportation, work, eating, drinking,
drug use, recreation, romance . . . )." Wilde calls the level of acceptable risk
the "target risk level," which differs for each individual and may change, for
example, due to time, experience, or social influences.24 Adams has added
complexity to this model, noting that our propensity to take risks also changes
depending on the potential rewards, and that our perceptions of risk are affected
25
by our past experience with our own and others' losses.
According to risk homeostasis theory, we continually modify our risk-
taking behaviors (within our ability to do so) so that our perceived risk
approaches our individual target risk level. That is, we decide how much
danger we find acceptable, and we make behavioral choices that we believe
will bring us closer to that level of risk-similar to the way a thermostat
activates heat or air conditioning when the temperature deviates from the
chosen set-point.26 When we feel excessively safe and see potential benefits27
in behaving more riskily, we will increase our risk-taking to capture those
benefits. For instance, instead of wearing a seatbelt and driving slowly, we may
choose to wear a seatbelt and drive faster to gain the value of arriving quickly.
Instead of taking PrEP drugs and also using condoms to prevent HIV, PrEP
users may decide to use condoms less frequently to capture the benefits that
may come with unprotected sex. Similarly, when we perceive unacceptably
high levels of risk, we decrease our risk-taking and engage in more risk-
avoidant behavior; for example, to pose a counterpoint to the landmark seatbelt
28
study, drivers who are accustomed to seatbelt use may drive more slowly in a
car without seatbelts. 29 If a PrEP user can no longer afford his medication, he
may use condoms more frequently. Over time, we aim for a level of perceived
22. Wilde originally called this "risk compensation theory," but he has more recently relabeled
it as "risk homeostasis." See WILDE, supra note 21, at 29-30.
23. Id. at 5.
24. Id. at 5, 36-37; see also ADAMS, supra note 21, at 14-16.
25. ADAMS, supra note 21, at 15.
26. WILDE, supra note 21, at 5. As people engage in a risk-bearing activity, they
"continuously check the amount of risk they feel are exposed to ... compare this with the amount of risk
they are willing to accept, and try to reduce any difference between the two to zero." Id.
27. An extreme view of risk homeostasis theory would suggest that we increase our risk-
taking solely to maintain our target risk level, even when we lack any other motivation for doing so. See
Hedlund, supra note 21, at 87-88.
28. Peltzman, supra note 9.
29. See ADAMS, supra note 21, at 127-28 ("Most readers of this book will now be habitual
users of seatbelts. . . . Might you drive a little bit more carefully if you were deprived of the protection
of your seatbelt?").
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risk that is consistent with our target level. Risk homeostasis theory does not
suggest that we succeed in keeping our risk constant, but rather posits that we
adjust our behavior in the direction of the level where we perceive the most
desirable balance between risks and benefits.
The term "risk compensation" is used to describe a change in risk-taking
behavior as a response to an intervention (usually a new health or safety
technology); other names for this dynamic include "risk adaptation" and
"offsetting behavior." The latter term has been used most extensively in
economic and legal analyses, such as Professor Sam Peltzman's significant
study of auto safety regulations in 1975.30 Peltzman used time-series data to
analyze a variety of auto safety devices, such as lap seatbelts, energy-absorbing
steering columns, and dual braking systems; his analysis found that auto safety
regulations had not influenced the overall highway death rate, in part due to a
displacement in the burden of accidents from drivers to pedestrians. 31 Although
drivers were indeed less likely to die, Peltzman found evidence that they
compensated for their increased safety by driving with more "intensity"-faster
and more riskily-thereby endangering others on the road.32 Increases in the
nonfatal accident rate supported this explanation. 3 3 The energetic reaction to
34Peltzman's landmark study continues today, often parodying his work as a
recommendation to affix a dagger (or spike, or explosives) to the steering
wheel to encourage safer driving.35 One article notes that "the weight of the
evidence now suggests that if safety devices lead to less careful driving, the
effect is far more modest than Peltzman suggested, and not nearly enough to
offset the benefits of the devices."36 But even without fully offsetting the
benefits of a health or safety intervention, offsetting at any magnitude can
influence the preventive benefit, cost-effectiveness, and population-level
impact of the protective measure.
Modem views of risk compensation theory have recognized complexity in
these effects; an "extreme view" of risk homeostasis theory, which would
predict complete offsetting and dismiss motivations other than the desire to
30. Peltzman, supra note 9. Legal scholars have extensively criticized Peltzman's work over
the past few decades. See, e.g., Robert S. Chirinko & Edward P. Harper, Buckle Up or Slow Down? New
Estimates of Offsetting Behavior and Their Implications for Automobile Safety Regulation, 12 J. POLY
ANALYSIS & MGMT. 270 (1993); John J. Donohue III, Did Miranda Diminish Police Effectiveness?, 50
STAN. L. REv. 1147, 1158-60 (1998) (noting that "all serious economists, econometricians, and
statisticians now concede" that Peltzman's model was flawed).
31. Peltzman, supra note 9, at 717.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. See supra note 30 and accompanying sources.
35. See, e.g., ADAMS, supra note 21, at 155. See also David Bjerklie, The Hidden Danger of
Seat Belts, TIME, Nov. 30, 2006, http://www.time.com/time/nation/article/0,8599,1564465,00.html
("[Ilmagine how it might affect the behavior of drivers if a sharp stake were mounted in the middle of
the steering wheel? Or if the bumper were packed with explosives.").
36. David Alan Sklansky, Killer Seatbelts and Criminal Procedure, 199 HARv. L. REV. F. 56,
57 (2006).
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keep risk constant, is now disfavored.37 In a review of this literature, Dr. James
Hedlund has identified four factors that must be present to provoke a risk
compensation response to a health or safety intervention: (1) the intervention
must be visible because an unnoticed change will not influence risk
perceptions; (2) the intervention must have some effect on the individual; that
is, it must give rise to the perception of protection; (3) the individual must have
a motivation to increase his risk-taking-he will not take more risks just for the
sake of maintaining a constant target risk level; and (4) the individual must
have sufficient control and opportunity to adjust his behavior,38 which is
particularly relevant given the social context of many health and safety
behaviors. Each of these four conditions is complex, and there is room for
extensive variation across individuals, across different health and safety
products, and over time. This framework is also flexible with regard to the
target risk level; individual preference for risk may also change for any number
of reasons. All four of Hedlund's conditions are fulfilled for behavioral
responses to prescription drugs. 39
1. Criticisms of Risk Homeostasis Theory
Risk homeostasis theory has been controversial. Some have criticized the
theory on the grounds that individuals are incapable of precisely calibrating
their risks,40 while others have pointed to empirical evidence showing that the
gains of many safety devices outweigh any behavioral adjustment. 4 1 These
criticisms, however, misunderstand the theory to require complete behavioral
offsetting and a precisely constant level of risk. The same error is evident in the
indictment of risk compensation theory as an excuse to do nothing about unsafe
behaviors, on the theory that offsetting will void every benefit.4 2 But the theory
of risk compensation is not so exacting-it predicts only an adjustment to the
37. Hedlund, supra note 21.
38. Id. at 88.
39. That is, individuals taking prescription drugs are conscious of their medications; these
medications will likely give rise to a meaningful perception of benefit; individuals may find benefits in
behaviors that confer health risks; and often individuals have the opportunity to modify their behaviors.
40. See, e.g., Frank P. McKenna, Do Safety Measures Really Work? An Examination of Risk
Homoeostasis Theory, 28 ERGONOMICS 489 (1985); Frank P. McKenna, Evidence and Assumptions
Relevant to Risk Homoeostasis, 28 ERGONOMICS 1539 (1985); Frank P. McKenna, What Role Should
the Concept ofRisk Play in Theories ofAccident Involvement?, 31 ERGONOMICS 469-484 (1988); Brian
O'Neill & Allan Williams, Risk Homeostasis Hypothesis: A Rebuttal, 4 INJURY PREVENTION 92 (1998).
Cf Gerald J.S. Wilde, Assumptions Necessary and Unnecessary to Risk Homoeostasis, 28 ERGONOMICS
1531 (1985); Gerald J.S. Wilde, Evidence Refuting the Theory of Risk Homoeostasis? A Rejoinder to
Frank P. McKenna, 27 ERGONOMICS 297 (1984).
41. See, e.g., Leonard Evans, Comments on Wilde's Notes on 'Risk Homeostasis Theory and
Traffic Accident Data', 6 RISK ANALYSIS 103 (1986); Leonard Evans, Risk Homeostasis Theory and
Traffic Accident Data, 6 RISK ANALYSIS 81 (1986); O'Neill & Williams, supra note 40; Harry S.
Shannon, Road-Accident Data: Interpreting the British Experience with Particular Reference to the Risk
Homoeostasis Theory, 29 ERGONOMICS 1005-15 (1986).
42. Gerald J.S. Wilde et al., For and Against: Does Risk Homoeostasis Theory Have




extent that individuals have the opportunity and motivation to take more risks.
These factors will vary widely, and in-depth study is necessary to understand
how risk compensation will operate in any given field.
Some may counter that health and safety measures should actually lead to
reductions in risky behavior, rather than increases, because the use of a safety
measure may make risks more salient. The conscious use of a safety product
may indeed make people more cognizant of underlying dangers; for instance,
when a cyclist puts on a helmet, she may think more about the risk that she will
crash, and therefore she may take additional precautions with this risk in mind.
This result, however, is not necessarily inconsistent with risk compensation
theory. The cyclist's greater focus on crashing has motivated a change in the
target risk level, the level of risk that she is willing to accept. This change shifts
the entire system of risk calculus to a lower level of preferred risk, in which the
cyclist becomes less willing to trade safety in exchange for speed. Around that
new target risk level, there may still be compensation effects-that is, the
cyclist may ride more slowly when her helmet inspires her to think about
crashing, but she may have reduced her speed even more if she had thought
about the same risks without wearing her helmet.
Finally, some have criticized risk homeostasis theory on the grounds that
individuals are insufficiently rational to engage in the decisions required for
risk compensation behavior to take place.43 The mechanism of risk
compensation behavior is cognitive: an individual must appraise his baseline
risk level, identify a change in that risk level, and compute the balance of risks
and rewards attached to a risky behavior. He must then decide whether taking
an additional risk will cause him to exceed his target risk level. There are many
reasons to be skeptical of the individual's ability to calculate risks accurately:
as Wilde has acknowledged, the degree to which an individual succeeds in
maintaining his target risk level "depends upon [his] perceptual, decisional, and
executional skills."44 But instead of requiring complete rationality and
accuracy, risk compensation theory builds in a wide margin for irrational
actors. Our behavioral choices are based on our perceptions of risk and
benefit, however irrational those perceptions may be. A rich literature has
identified nonrational factors that influence our cognitions and risk perceptions,
such as emotion,4 6 cultural world-views, 47 cognitive biases such as optimiism,48
43. See, e.g., Frank P. McKenna, Behavioural Compensation and Safety, 9 J. OCCUPATIONAL
ACCIDENTS 107, 117 (1987) ("[I]ndividuals do not have the computational power to assess and exactly
compensate for changes in the probabilities of very infrequent events such as accidents."),
44. Gerald J.S. Wilde, The Theory of Risk Homeostasis: Implications for Safety and Health, 2
RISK ANALYSIS 209, 210 (1982).
45. See id. at 216 (identifying modifications to the risk compensation model depending on
erroneous perceptions of risk).
46. Dan M. Kahan, Two Conceptions of Emotion in Risk Regulation, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 741
(2008).
47. Dan M. Kahan et al., Who Fears the HPV Vaccine, Who Doesn't, and Why? An
Experimental Study of the Mechanisms of Cultural Cognition, 34 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 501 (2010); Dan
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mood, social norms and beliefs, personality factors such as sensation-seeking,
habits, and a variety of other factors. We may not be conscious of adjusting our
risk to fit a perceived target level, 49 and we may underestimate risks when they
50have become very familiar. Individuals may expect more benefit from new
technologies at first, and then notice those benefits less once the technologies
become routine.51 Several studies suggest that although we may believe that
others will engage in risk compensation, fewer of us believe that we will do it
ourselves.52 Behavioral adjustments may also be correlated within a community
due to social influences on risk perception and behavioral norms. These are all
challenges to rationality, but each may be incorporated into the risk
compensation dynamic. With the right data, it would be possible to design a
complex model of risk compensation that accounts for these influences.
2. Distinguishing Risk Compensation from Related Concepts
Risk compensation should not be confused with several similar concepts
in the legal literature. The same term has been used by Professor Nina Crimm
discussing tax exemption for charitable organizations, to suggest that tax
exemption is compensation for providing "inherently risky" public services.
This usage draws on the employment compensation literature, where "risk
compensation" refers to the additional financial remuneration paid to workers
in hazardous jobs.54
The behavioral phenomenon of risk compensation has a closer cognate in
the concept of moral hazard, as used throughout insurance law. Moral hazard
has two forms: ex ante moral hazard occurs when policyholders reduce the
protections they take to prevent losses that are covered by insurance, while ex
post moral hazard refers to the increased uptake of covered services (most
M. Kahan & Paul Slovic, Cultural Evaluations ofRisk: "Values" or "Blunders", 119 HARV. L. REv. F.
166 (2006).
48. Marie Helweg-Larsen & James A. Shepperd, Do Moderators of the Optimistic Bias Affect
Personal or Target Risk Estimates? A Review of the Literature, 5 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. REv.
74(2001).
49. Adriaan Heino et al., Risk Perception, Risk Taking, Accident Involvement and the Need for
Stimulation, 22 SAFETY SCL 35 (1996).
50. See Elizabeth Creyer, William Ross & Deborah Evers, Risky Recreation: An Exploration
of Factors Influencing the Likelihood of Participation and the Effects of Experience, 22 LEISURE STUD.
239, 243 (2003); Colin Powell, The Perception of Risk and Risk Taking Behavior: Implications for
Incident Prevention Strategies, 18 WILDERNESS & ENvTL. MED. 10, 13 (2007).
51. Malani, supra note 19, at 434-35.
52. Laura A.V. Marlow et al., Mothers' and Adolescents' Beliefs About Risk Compensation
Following HPV Vaccination, 44 J. ADOLESCENT HEALTH 446 (2009); Nuno Nodin et al., Knowledge
and Acceptability ofAlternative HIVPrevention Bio-Medical Products Among MSM Who Bareback, 20
AIDS CARE 106 (2008).
53. Nina J. Crimm, An Explanation of the Federal Income Tax Exemption for Charitable
Organizations: A Theory ofRisk Compensation, 50 FLA. L. REv. 419, 425 (1998).
54. See, e.g., Keith A. Bender, Hosne A. Mridha & James Peoples, Risk Compensation for




commonly health services) that policyholders would not have purchased out of
pocket.55 Ex post moral hazard is less relevant here, but ex ante moral hazard is
a close analogue to risk compensation-both represent increases in risk-taking
in response to a perceived reduction in risk, and at least one analysis has
suggested that they are synonymous.56 Although insurance does not reduce the
probability of incurring harm, it reduces the extent of harm to which the insured
person is exposed, thereby provoking increased risk-taking behavior." It may
be more precise to define ex ante moral hazard as a subspecies of risk
compensation that requires a specific stimulus, namely, the perceived
opportunity to shift financial losses to a third party.
Risk compensation may also be confused with substitution, in which an
individual shifts from one costly behavior to another that fulfills similar
motivations. One example of this dynamic is "addiction substitution" or
"addiction transfer" among patients who receive bariatric surgery for obesity,
but then develop substance use disorders in lieu of returning to a high-calorie
diet. Another incarnation familiar to legal scholarship is substitution in crime,
in which the price of one crime rises, prompting offenders to engage in other
types of crimes.59 The extent to which substitution falls under the risk
compensation umbrella depends on the level of generality we use to define the
risk. For example, if we are discussing all risks to health, we may view a switch
from overeating to substance use as part of a risk compensation response to
bariatric surgery. But if we solely examine risks from overeating, we may not
consider drug and alcohol use behaviors as relevant. In this way, risk
compensation behavior may sometimes entail substitution, but it is not
equivalent to a substitution response.
Finally, risk compensation in behavioral science literature is frequently
used synonymously with behavioral disinhibition, but the two are distinct. Both
are explanations for an increase in behavioral risk-taking. The mechanism of
behavioral disinhibition, however, is a lack of concern for risk altogether, rather
55. See George L. Priest, How Insurance Reduces Risks, mimeo. 11 (1996). For a recent
overview of moral hazard theory, see Michael H. LeRoy, Do Courts Create Moral Hazard?: When
Judges Nullify Employer Liability in Arbitrations, 93 MINN. L. REv. 998 (2009).
56. Malani, supra note 19.
57. Interestingly, one study has found that risk compensation effects are larger in response to
safety measures that reduce the likelihood of harm, compared to measures that reduce its extent. Fridulv
Sagberg et al., An Investigation ofBehavioural Adaptation to Airbags and Antilock Brakes Among Taxi
Drivers, 29 ACCIDENT ANALYSIS & PREVENTION 293, 301 (1997).
58. See Valentina Ivezaj et al., '7 Didn't See This Coming. ": Why Are Postbariatric Patients
in Substance Abuse Treatment? Patients' Perceptions of Etiology and Future Recommendations, 22
OBESITY SURGERY 1308 (2012); Andrea Wendling & Andrea Wudyka, Narcotic Addiction Following
Gastric Bypass Surgery-A Case Study, 21 OBESITY SURGERY 680 (2011) (discussing mixed evidence
of postoperative narcotic dependence among bariatric surgery patients).
59. For an explanation of this theory, see Neal Kumar Katyal, Deterrence's Difficulty, 95
MICH. L. REv. 2385, 2391-402 (1997).
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than the recalibration of perceived risk.60 For instance, someone who drinks
diet soda may choose to eat more sweets because she perceives a lower risk of
weight gain. This is risk compensation, and the mechanism embeds a
continuing concern about the risk. However, behavioral disinhibition occurs
when the risk itself becomes less salient; for example, someone may consume
more sweets because she no longer "cares" about weight gain, or because she
61has decided that weight gain is unavoidable. While risk compensation is
based on a continuing preoccupation with risk, disinhibition yields similar
behavioral effects by altogether reducing the concern.6 2
B. Empirical Basis
Empirical evidence exists both to support and to challenge risk
compensation theory. Although some have called for more rigorous analyses of
existing risk compensation research,63 the most rigorous tests for risk
compensation responses to health and safety interventions may be altogether
absent. The primary reasons for this are ethical-the requirement of equipoise
and the need to avoid deceiving participants. 4 This section will first examine
methodological difficulties in producing empirical evidence on risk
compensation, and then enumerate evidence on both sides of this theory.
1. Methodological Limitations
The gold standard for testing the effect of any intervention is a double-
blinded randomized trial in which participants are randomly assigned to receive
the active treatment or a comparison (e.g., a placebo or another treatment).
However, a trial designed to measure risk compensation behavior would need
to assign participants to two different perceptions of protection, not necessarily
two different states of actual protection. All participants in a typical placebo-
controlled drug trial are told to be uncertain about their treatment condition and
drug efficacy; although participants may hold their own beliefs about drug
efficacy, there is no reason to expect different trial arms to differ in the benefit
they expect from the drug. Because the two groups do not differ systematically
60. Matthew Hogben & Nicole Liddon, Disinhibition and Risk Compensation: Scope
Definitions, and Perspective, 35 SEXUALLY TRANSMITTED DISEASEs 1009, 1009 (2008).
61. See id. (citing a parallel example in HIV prevention literature).
62. That is, behavioral disinhibition represents a change in the target risk level, whereby an
individual becomes comfortable with a greater exposure to risk.
63. See, e.g., Fred P. Rivara et al., Research on Injury Prevention: Topics for Systematic
Review, 8 INJURY PREVENTION 161 (2002); Diane C. Thompson et al., Risk Compensation Theory
Should Be Subject to Systematic Reviews of the Scientiic Evidence, 7 INJURY PREVENTION 86 (2001).
64. See, e.g., Kristen Underhill, Study Designs for Identifying Risk Compensation Behavior
Among Users of Biomedical HIV Prevention Technologies: Balancing Methodological Rigor and
Research Ethics, Soc. SCL & MED. (forthcoming 2013) (commenting on the lack of rigorous study





in their perceptions, a comparison of the two trial arms is inappropriate for
assessing risk compensation effects.65
The theoretically ideal study design for isolating risk compensation
behavior would be to conduct a randomized trial after a drug has been proven
efficacious. In this trial, one arm should knowingly receive the active,
efficacious drug, while the other should receive no treatment. If earlier placebo-
controlled trials found no behavioral differences between groups, it would be
clear that the drug does not pharmacologically cause changes in risk behavior.
In this new trial, therefore, any differences in risk-taking behavior between the
two groups could be attributed to different perceptions of risk and protection,
not to the drug itself. This would provide a rigorous test of risk compensation,
but it would violate the requirement of clinical equipoise-the need for genuine
doubt about the relative merits of the two conditions. Because one trial arm
would receive an effective drug while the other arm received nothing, there is
little doubt that participants in the active arm would benefit more from the
study, as long as they do not adjust their risk-taking behavior so much as to
overwhelm the beneficial effect of the drug. This study would also run afoul
of ethical guidelines governing the conditions under which it is acceptable to
use placebos,6 8 as well as guidelines on deceiving study participants.69
Professor Anup Malani has recently suggested an alternative study design
for testing placebo effects, which would provide a method for testing risk
compensation behavior as well. Instead of comparing an active treatment arm
and a placebo arm in a single trial, Malani has proposed comparing the active
arms of two different trials that used different probabilities of assignment to
65. Any behavioral differences observed between groups would be attributable to the
pharmacological operation of the drug, rather than the cognitive mechanism of risk compensation
behavior. See Kristen Underhill, Letter to the Editor, 364 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1374 (2011).
66. TOM L. BEAUCHAMP & JAMES F. CHILDRESS, PRINCIPLES OF BIOMEDICAL ETHICS 320
(6th ed. 2009).
67. Similar ethical objections would prevent a trial that provided active drugs to all
participants but then deceived some participants into believing that the drug was a placebo. If
participants in the deceived arm stopped taking their pills, there is little doubt that they would benefit
less than the participants who received truthful information. It would be even less acceptable to provide
placebos to all participants, but then to deceive some participants into believing that the placebos were
active drugs.
68. COUNCIL FOR INT'L ORGS. OF MEDICAL SCI., INTERNATIONAL ETHICAL GUIDELINES FOR
BIOMEDICAL RESEARCH INVOLVING HUMAN SUBJECTS 54 (2002).
69. National Commission for the Protection of Human Subjects of Research, Belmont Report:
Ethical Principles and Guidelines for the Protection of Human Subjects of Research, 44 Fed. Reg.
23,192, 23,195 (Apr. 18, 1979). Although this study design would be ethically unfeasible for scientists,
an identical scenario may arise naturally in clinical service settings. For example, if a community clinic
randomly selects patients to receive treatment according to a lottery system, scientists could take
advantage of this context to measure behavior. One study has examined the allocation of health
insurance according to a lottery system, finding increases in health care utilization and improved
physical and mental health among insurance recipients. Amy Finkelstein et al., The Oregon Health
Insurance Experiment: Evidence from the First Year, 127 Q.J. ECON. 1057 (2012). The study has found
"no evidence of 'ex ante moral hazard"' in smoking behavior. Amy FINKELSTEIN, MORAL HAZARD IN
HEALTH INSURANCE: DEVELOPMENTS SINCE ARROW (1963) 14 (2012), available at
http://cgt.columbia.edu/files/papers/Finkelstein-Arrow-lectureFINALSLIDES_TOPOST.pdf.
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treatment.7 0 If participants in trial 1 knowingly have a 50% chance of
assignment to treatment, and participants in trial 2 knowingly have a 70%
chance of assignment to treatment, then participants in trial 2 may be more
likely to believe that they are receiving an effective drug. As a result,
participants in trial 2 may have a higher perception of protection, the driver of
risk compensation behavior. Comparing just the active arms of each study
would also ensure that the behavioral effects are in fact due to perceptions of
protection, rather than any pharmacological effects of the drug itself.
To date, Malani's design has not been used to measure risk compensation.
In the absence of data with randomized designs, therefore, the evidence for risk
compensation has relied on less rigorous approaches, such as cohort or panel
72 73studies,7 1 simulation studies,72 within-participants designs, open label trials
without control groups, 74 and randomized studies for which a placebo control is
impractical. These studies do not conclusively show causality. Moreover,
even a perfectly designed study may still have limited applicability to non-trial
settings. Research conducted at the efficacy stage must inform participants that
the efficacy of the experimental drug is uncertain, while users in the real world
will have more certainty about protection. Such studies may also become
outdated if perceptions of risk and protection change over time.
2. Evidence Supporting a Risk Compensation Model
With the methodological caveats above, empirical evidence from various
health and safety fields tends to support risk compensation effects. Risk
compensation theory first arose in the realm of driving safety, and this
emphasis has continued. Drivers' speed or risk-taking has been found to
increase in response to antilock brakes, seatbelts,n road lighting78 and
70. Anup Malani, Identifying Placebo Effects with Data from Clinical Trials, 114 J. POUT.
ECON. 236 (2006).
71. See, e.g., Alma Cohen & Rajeev Dehejia, The Effect of Automobile Insurance and
Accident Liability Laws on Traffic Fatalities, 47 J.L. & ECON. 357 (2004)
72. See, e.g., A. Ian Glendon et al., A Review of Risk Homeostasis Theory in Simulated
Environments, 22 SAFETY SCL 15 (1996).
73. See, e.g., Barbara A. Morrongiello et al., Risk Compensation in Children: Why Do
Children Show It in Reaction to Wearing Safety Gear?, 28 J. APPLIED DEVELOPMENTAL PSYCHOL. 56
(2007).
74. Jeffrey N. Martin et al., Use ofPostexposure Prophylaxis Against HIVInfection Following
Sexual Exposure Does Not Lead to Increases in High-Risk Behavior, 18 AIDS 787 (2004).
75. See, e.g., Robert C. Bailey et al., Male Circumcision for HIV Prevention in Young Men in
Kisumu, Kenya: A Randomised Controlled Trial, 369 LANCET 643 (2007). Although circumcision
studies may come closest to a rigorous test of risk compensation, they are still imperfect, because
participants in the intervention group were uncertain whether male circumcision would be effective for
preventing HIV.
76. David W. Harless & George E. Hoffer, The Antilock Braking System Anomaly: A Drinking
Driver Problem?, 34 ACCIDENT ANALYSIS & PREVENTION 333 (2002).
77. John Adams, Seat Belt Laws: Repeal Them?, 4 SIGNIFICANCE 86 (2007); Mark McCarthy,
The Benefit of Seat Belt Legislation in the United Kingdom, 43 J. EPIDEMIOLOGY & COMMUNITY




visibility,79 head and neck restraint systems for racecar drivers so airbags,81
driving four-wheel-drive vehicles,82 and driving in familiar locations.83
Meanwhile, analyses have also shown reductions in speed when drivers are
talking on the phone,8 intoxicated,85 or performing more difficult tasks -all
times of greater risk. Studies of safety equipment have mirrored these
findings.87
Several legal articles have conducted empirical tests of risk compensation
models, all using regression analyses. These have included analyses of seat belt
legislation, airbags, automobile insurance mandates,90  fuel economy
standards, 9' consumer product safety regulations (including medication
Compensation: Between-Subject Versus Within-Subject Analyses, 20 ACCIDENT ANALYSIS &
PREVENTION 277 (1988). These findings, however, are controversial. See, e.g., Murray Mackay, Seat
Belts and Risk Compensation, 291 BR. MED. J. 757 (1985) (citing studies for the proposition that risk
compensation does not occur among drivers using seat belts).
78. Terje Assum et al., Risk Compensation-The Case of Road Lighting, 31 ACCIDENT
ANALYSIS & PREVENTION 545 (1999).
79. Neville A. Stanton & Marcel Pinto, Behavioural Compensation by Drivers of a Simulator
When Using a Vision Enhancement System, 43 ERGONOMics 1359 (2000).
80. Pope & Tollison, supra note 9.
81. David W. Harless & George E. Hoffer, Testing for Offsetting Behavior and Adverse
Recruitment Among Drivers with Airbag-Equipped Vehicles, 70 J. RISK & INS. 629 (2003); Richard
Kent et al., The Field Performance of Frontal Air Bags: A Review of the Literature, 6 TRAFFIC INJURY
PREVENTION 1 (2005); Peterson et al., supra note 12.
82. Lesley Walker et al., Unsafe Driving Behaviour and Four Wheel Drive Vehicles:
Observational Study, 333 BRIT. MED. J. 333 (2006).
83. Tom Rosenbloom et al., Women Drivers' Behavior in Well-Known Versus Less Familiar
Locations, 38 J. SAFETY RES. 283 (2007).
84. D.E. Haigney et al., Concurrent Mobile (Cellular) Phone Use and Driving Performance:
Task Demand Characteristics and Compensatory Processes, 3 TRANSP. RES. 113 (2000).
85. Jean-Pascal Assailly, The Prevention of Young Driver's DWI (Driving While Intoxicated)
and RWDI (Riding with a Driver Under Influence) in Europe: A Social-Sequential Model, 5 TRAFFIC
INJURY PREVENTION 237 (2004).
86. Ray Fuller, Towards a General Theory of Driver Behaviour, 37 ACCIDENT ANALYSIS &
PREVENTION 461 (2005).
87. Decreased vigilance or increased risk-taking has been observed in response to a variety of
technologies. See, e.g., J. Adams & Mayer Hillman, The Risk Compensation Theory and Bicycle
Helmets, 7 INJURY PREVENTION 89, 89-90 (2001) (citing evidence related to the use of bicycle helmets);
Daniel H. Daneshvar et al., Helmets and Mouth Guards: The Role of Personal Equipment in Preventing
Sport-Related Concussions, 30 CLINICAL SPORTS MED. 145, 157 (2011) (concerning protective gear in
sports); Brent Hagel & Willem Meeuwisse, Risk Compensation: A "Side Effect" of Sport Injury
Prevention?, 14 CLINICAL J. SPORT MED. 193 (2004) (considering protective gear in sports; good
visibility of trails for skiers); Morrongiello et al., supra note 73 (analyzing the use of safety equipment
for children); Robert B. Noland, Perceived Risk and Modal Choice: Risk Compensation in
Transportation Systems, 27 ACCIDENT ANALYSIS & PREVENTION 503 (1995) (analyzing improvements
in bicycle safety); Stephen E. Ryan, Injury Risk Compensation in Children with Disabilities: Could
Assistive Technology Devices Have a Dark Side?, 5 DISABILITY & REHABILITATION: ASSISTIVE TECH.
199 (2010) (focusing on assistive devices for disabled children); Viscusi, supra note II (considering
child-resistant packaging of medications).
88. Anindya Sen, An Empirical Test ofthe Offset Hypothesis, 44 J.L. & EcoN. 481 (2001).
89. Peterson et al., supra note 12.
90. Cohen & Dehejia, supra note 71.
91. Godek, supra note 13.
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packaging rules),92 gun safe-storage laws, mandated insurance for diabetes 94
and addictions treatment,95 and the legalization of abortion.96 Nearly all of
these analyses found support for risk compensation effects, although the
strength of these effects varied.9 7 No analysis found evidence that safety
precautions lead to overall decreases in risk-taking.
In public health, risk compensation dynamics have featured prominently
in the HIV prevention literature,98 as new prevention strategies such as PrEP,
male circumcision, post-exposure use of antiretroviral drugs, and vaccines have
undergone testing. The literature on PrEP has not yet provided a rigorous test of
risk compensation behavior, although double-blinded studies have not found
increases in risk behavior over the course of trial activities." Qualitative and
survey studies suggest that risk compensation may occur among users of
PrEP'00 and HIV prevention vaccines.' 0' In the three existing randomized trials
of male circumcision for HIV prevention, behavioral outcomes from every trial
point in the direction of risk compensation (i.e., newly circumcised men
reported riskier behaviors than men in the control group), but the difference
was statistically significant in only one trial.102 Survey research has also
identified relationships between risky sexual activities and beliefs about the
preventive impact of antiretroviral treatment,' 03 as well as increases in sexual
activity (number of partners and frequency of sex) among people who use
92. W. Kip Viscusi, Consumer Behavior and the Safety Effects of Product Safety Regulation,
28 J.L. & ECON. 527 (1985).
93. Lott, supra note 10.
94. Klick & Stratmann, supra note 16.
95. Klick & Stratmann, supra note 15.
96. Klick & Stratmann, supra note 14.
97. See Cohen & Dehejia, supra note 71; Godek et al., supra note 13; sources cites supra
notes 14-16; Peterson et al, supra note 12; Sen, supra note 88; Viscusi, supra note 92.
98. Lisa A. Eaton & Seth Kalichman, Risk Compensation in HIVPrevention: Implications for
Vaccines, Microbicides, and Other Biomedical HIV Prevention Technologies, 4 CURRENT HIV/AIDS
REP. 165 (2007).
99. See, e.g., Baeten et al., supra note 20, at 405 (reporting behavioral analyses of a double-
blinded randomized controlled trial of PrEP among heterosexual couples); Grant et al., supra note 20, at
2598 (reporting results of a double-blinded randomized trial of PrEP among transgender women and
men who have sex with men); Thigpen et al., supra note 20, at 428 (reporting results of a double-blinded
randomized trials of PrEP among heterosexual men and women).
100. Sarit A. Golub et al., Preexposure Prophylaxis and Predicted Condom Use Among High-
Risk Men Who Have Sex with Men, 54 J. ACQUIRED IMMUNE DEFICIENCY SYNDROMES 548, 552 (2010);
Nodin, supra note 52, at 112.
101. See, e.g., Peter A. Newman et al., Preventive HIV Vaccine Acceptability and Behavioral
Risk Compensation Among a Random Sample of High-Risk Adults in Los Angeles (LA VOICES), 44
HEALTH SERVICES REs. 2167, 2174 (2009).
102. See Nandi Siegfried et al., Male Circumcision for Prevention of Heterosexual Acquisition
of HIV in Men (Oct. 7, 2009) (on file with Cochrane Library) (concluding that "these more risky
behaviours could indicate possible disinhibition among circumcised men"); see also Seth Kalichman et
al., Circumcision for HIV Prevention: Failure to Fully Account for Behavioral Risk Compensation, 4
PuB. LIBR. SCI. MED. 597, 597 (2007).
103. See, e.g., Nicole Crepaz et al., Highly Active Antiretroviral Therapy and Sexual Risk




condoms." In studies of HPV vaccine acceptability, interview findings
suggest that some women predicted that they may engage in more sexual
activity as a result of receiving the vaccine. os
Risk compensation and risk homeostasis theories have more gradually
been incorporated outside the sexually transmitted infection field. Studies have
suggested risk compensation effects of Lyme disease vaccination (which led to
a decrease in preventive behaviors such as using tick repellant), o0 drinking
beer as compared to hard alcohols (which may lead to more consumption
because beer is perceived as safer), o0 consuming diet sodas (which may lead to
overconsumption of other calories),108 using low-tar or filtered cigarettes
(which are linked with increased smoking), 109 and taking fish oil supplements
(which may increase other risk behaviors leading to heart disease).'1 0 Among
health care staff, studies have found that a perception of increased blood safety
has increased rates of blood transfusion."' Cultural beliefs that inform changed
perceptions of risk can also play a role in risk compensation; for example, one
study has found that the belief in elevated risk during "ghost month" in
southern China may reduce drowning deaths, as people avoid risky activities
such as swimming during this time.1 12
3. Evidence Against Risk Compensation
To be sure, some evidence also runs counter to risk compensation theory.
Studies seeking risk compensation effects have yielded nonsignificant or weak
findings in studies of bicycle helmet use,'13 seatbelts,ll 4 airbags,u 5 vehicle
104. Steven D. Pinkerton, Sexual Risk Compensation and HIVSTD Transmission: Empirical
Evidence and Theoretical Considerations, 21 RISK ANALYSIS 727, 728 (2001).
105. Loretta Brabin et al., A Survey of Adolescent Experiences of Human Papillomavirus
Vaccination in the Manchester Study, 101 BRIT. J. CANCER. 1502, 1503 (2009).
106. Noel T. Brewer et al., Risk Compensation and Vaccination: Can Getting Vaccinated
Cause People To Engage in Risky Behaviors?, 34 ANNALS BEHAV. MED. 95 (2007); Marlow et at.,
supra note 52.
107. John D. Rogers & Thomas K. Greenfield, Beer Drinking Accounts for Most of the
Hazardous Alcohol Consumption Reported in the United States, 60 J. STUD. ALCOHOL 732 (1999).
108. See Sharon P. Fowler et al., Fueling the Obesity Epidemic? Artificially Sweetened
Beverage Use and Long-Term Weight Gain, 16 OBESITY 1894, 1899 (2008) (citing studies).
109. Robert J. Maccoun, Testing Drugs Versus Testing for Drug Use: Private Risk
Management in the Shadow of Criminal Law, 56 DEPAUL L. REV. 507, 531 (2007); Kenneth E. Warner
& John Slade, Low Tar, High Toll, 82 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 17 (1992).
110. Michael L. Burr et al., Lack ofBenefit ofDietary Advice to Men with Angina: Results ofa
Controlled Trial, 57 EUR. J. CLINICAL NUTRITION 193, 193-200 (2003).
111. Mo Amin et al., Does a Perception of Increased Blood Safety Mean Increased Blood
Transfusion? An Assessment of the Risk Compensation Theory in Canada, 4 BMC PUB. HEALTH 1
(2004).
112. C.-H. Yang et al., Belief in Ghost Month Can Help Prevent Drowning Deaths: A Natural
Experiment on the Effects of Cultural Beliefs on Risky Behaviours, 66 SOC. SC. & MED. 1990 (2008).
113. Pablo Lardelli-Claret et al., Risk Compensation Theory and Voluntary Helmet Use by
Cyclists in Spain, 9 INJURY PREVENTION 128 (2003).
114. See, e.g., David J. Houston & Lilliard E. Richardson, Risk Compensation or Risk
Reduction? Seatbelts, State Laws, and Traffic Fatalities, 88 SOCIAL SCI. Q. 913, 936 (2007); Shinji
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safety inspections," 6 snowboard helmets," 7 children's safety equipment," 8
hypertension medications," 9 statins, 120 participation in a needle exchange
programs,121 and wearing socks over one's shoes to get better traction on icy
sidewalks.' 22
Evidence that undermines risk compensation theory should not be
dismissed. But without rigorous studies capable of manipulating risk
perceptions as the independent variable, correlational evidence remains
problematic for concluding whether risk compensation effects occur. Mixed
evidence across different health and safety behaviors may simply indicate that
risk compensation is context-specific. The fact remains, however, that
systematic risk compensation behavior has been observed in some contexts,
that the direction of these behaviors is predictable, and that this behavioral
phenomenon has altogether escaped our notice in the regulation of
pharmaceutical products.
C. Risk Compensation in Legal Scholarship
Beyond the empirical studies cited above, legal literature has frequently
engaged with offsetting behavior in theoretical discussions. These primarily
focus on the extent to which risk compensation may undermine the benefits of
products or regulations intended to improve health and safety. Such
discussions, however, generally highlight the lack of empirical evidence to
determine whether risk compensation is occurring. Legal commentators have
raised these concerns across a variety of fields, including the regulation of
consumer products and environmental risks,123 the regulation of behaviors
Nakahara et al., Seatbelt Legislation in Japan: High Risk Driver Mortality and Seatbelt Use, 9 INJURY
PREVENTION 29, 29-32 (2003); Harry S. Shannon & Peter Szatmari, Seat-Belt Legislation and Risk
Homeostasis: Further Analysis of the British Data, 26 ACCIDENT ANALYSIS & PREVENTION 803, 803-05
(1994).
115. O'Neill & Williams, supra note 40; Peterson et al., supra note 12.
116. Marc Poitras & Daniel Sutter, Policy Ineffectiveness or Offsetting Behavior? An Analysis
of Vehicle Safety Inspections, 68 S. ECON. J. 922, 932 (2002).
117. Michael D. Scott et al., Testing the Risk Compensation Hypothesis for Safety Helmets in
Alpine Skiing and Snowboarding, 13 INJURY PREVENTION 173 (2007).
118. I. Barry Pless et al., Risk-Compensation Behavior in Children: Myth or Reality?, 160
ARCHIVES PEDIATRICS ADOLESCENT MED. 610 (2006).
119. Andrew Steptoe & Anne McMunn, Health Behaviour Patterns in Relation to
Hypertension: The English Longitudinal Study ofAgeing, 27 J. HYPERTENSION 224 (2009).
120. Craig I. Coleman et al., The Effect of Statins on the Development of New-Onset Type 2
Diabetes: A Meta-Analysis of Randomized Controlled Trials, 24 CURRENT MED. RES. & OPINION 1359
(2008); Devin M. Mann et al., Dietary Indiscretion and Statin Use, 82 MAYO CLINIC PROCEEDINGS 951
(2007).
121. Martin T. Schechter et al., Do Needle Exchange Programs Increase the Spread of HIV
Among Injection Drug Users: An Investigation of the Vancouver Outbreak, 16 AIDS F45 (1999).
122. Lianne Parkin et al., Preventing Winter Falls: A Randomised Controlled Trial of a Novel
Intervention, 122 N.Z. MED. J. 31 (2009).
123. See, e.g., Bernstein, supra note 18, at 679 (discussing regulation of consumer product




including sports and driving,12 4 gun safety and ownership, 125 health behaviors
in the context of antidiscrimination law,12 6 and the behavior of individuals who
are insured against risk. 127
Concerns about risk compensation behavior have addressed not only
physical risk-taking, but also financial and ethical risk-taking. For instance,
authors have considered offsetting behavior as potentially undermining legal
rules designed to regulate financial markets,128 regulations requiring that
851, 907-08 (1996) (analyzing regulation of consumer product safety); Frances L. Edwards, Worker
Right-to-Know Laws: Ineffectiveness of Current Policy-Making and a Proposed Legislative Solution, 15
B.C. ENvTL. AFF. L. REV. 1, 27 (1987) (discussing mandated provision of safety information to
workers); John D. Graham, Legislative Approaches to Achieving More Protection Against Risk at Less
Cost, 1997 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 13, 19-20 (1997) (describing EPA regulation and other regulatory
programs); Michael S. Greve, Preemption Choice: The Theory, Law, and Reality of Federalism's Core
Question, 26 CONST. COMMENT 679, 689 (2010) (discussing general health and safety regulation);
Donald P. Judges, Of Rocks and Hard Places: The Value of Risk Choice, 42 EMORY L.J. 1, 84 n.277
(1993) (considering regulation of consumer product safety); Malani, supra note 19 (examining the
regulation of prescription drug products); J. Gregg Miller, Jr., Comment, Risk Homeostasis and
California Design Defect Products Liability: Rethinking the Consumer Expectations and Risk-Benefit
Tests, 32 U.S.F. L. REV. 587, 595-99 (1998) (considering anti-lock brake installation); Ross D. Petty,
Regulation vs. the Market: The Case of Bicycle Safety (pt. 2), 2 RISK 93 (1991) (discussing bicycle
safety regulation); C. Gregory Ruffennach, Free Markets, Individual Liberties and Safe Coal Mines: A
Post-Sago Perspective, Ill W. VA. L. REV. 75, 109 (2009) (discussing mining safety regulation); Cass
R. Sunstein, Is Tobacco a Drug? Administrative Agencies as Common Law Courts, 47 DUKE L.J. 1013,
1026 n.67 (1998) (discussing a potential ban on tobacco); Jonathan Tetzlaff, Risk Management in a
Dangerous World: Practical Approaches, 12 DEPAUL Bus. L.J. 291, 296-97 (1999-2000) (considering
corporate management of physical and environmental risks).
124. Daniel A. Farber, A Place-Based Theory of Standing, 55 UCLA L. REV. 1505, 1541
n.160 (2008) (discussing possible offsetting behavior by drivers when gasoline use is regulated); Robert
W. Hahn & Patrick M. Dudley, The Disconnect Between Law and Policy Analysis: A Case Study of
Drivers and Cell Phones, 55 ADMIN. L. REv. 127, 149-150 (2003) (discussing banning the use of cell
phones while driving); Lawrence Lessig, The Regulation ofSocial Meaning, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 943, 968
n.68 (1995) (discussing rules requiring hockey players to wear helmets); Robert J. MacCoun, Testing
Drugs Versus Testing for Drug Use: Private Risk Management in the Shadow of Criminal Law, 56
DEPAUL L. REV. 507, 522-23, 531-32 (2007) (discussing rules for drug-testing athletes and permitting
harm-reduction organizations to test club drugs for safety); Eric A. Posner & Cass R. Sunstein, Dollars
and Death, 72 U. CHI. L. REv. 537, 577-78 (2005) (discussing offsetting behavior by parents when
regulations require purchase of safety equipment for their children).
125. David B. Kopel, Treating Guns Like Consumer Products, 148 U. PA. L. REv. 1213, 1236-
37, 1239 (2000); Leonardatos, Blackman & Kopel, Smart Guns/Foolish Legislators, supra note 10, at
209-10, 217-18; John R. Lott, Jr. & David B. Mustard, Crime, Deterrence, and Right-to-Carry
Concealed Handguns, 26 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 11-12 (1997); Jens Ludwig, Gun Self-Defense and
Deterrence, 27 CRIME & JUST. 363, 387 (2000).
126. Adam R. Pulver, An Imperfect Fit: Obesity, Public Health, and Disability
Antidiscrimination Law, 41 COLUM. J.L. & SOc. PROBS. 365, 408-09 (2008) (suggesting that by
"reducing the quality of life costs" associated with obesity, antidiscrimination laws that protect obese
people "may lead people to take less care in avoiding" obesity).
127. Robert Charles Clark, Does the Nonprofit Form Fit the Hospital Industry?, 93 HARV. L.
REV. 1417, 1424 n.18 (1980) (discussing the provision of health insurance to uninsured people); Shari
Seidman Diamond & Neil Vidmar, Jury Room Ruminations on Forbidden Topics, 87 VA. L. REV. 1857,
1875 n.57 (2001) (noting that carrying insurance may affect risk-taking, and ascribing this view to "risk
compensation theorists").
128. Jane K. Winn, Are "Better" Security Breach Notification Laws Possible?, 24 BERKELEY
TEcHL.J. 1133, 1141 (2009).
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corporations disclose waivers of ethics codes, 129 and laws providing uninsured
people with health insurance (on the theory that newly insured people will
reduce financial saving practices).130 Concerns about "self-licensing" may be
another example; when individuals are given the opportunity to establish their
credentials as nonbiased (reducing the risk of being perceived as prejudiced),
they are later more likely to express prejudiced attitudes.' 3 ' Rules forcing
physicians to disclose conflicts of interest (ostensibly reducing the risk that
advice will im roperly bias patients) may lead the physicians to provide more
biased advice.
Several articles to date have applied risk compensation theory to FDA
regulation and products liability law. Malani's analysis of placebo effects
comes closest to the present inquiry.133 His proposal calls for the FDA to
consider positive placebo effects, but not risk compensation effects when
approving new drugs; he also notes that proper labeling may help to reduce risk
compensation effects by limiting the expectations that give rise to risk
behaviors. Several products liability articles have also addressed risk
compensation behavior. Robert Spendlove has noted that consumer offsetting
behavior may change a safety product "from a risk reducing technology to a
new utility technology," engaging in value-creating behavior (e.g., driving
faster), that would not be possible without the safety technology (e.g.,
airbags).134 One proposal has suggested that risk homeostasis theory should
prompt revision of legal tests that depend on consumer expectations to identify
product defects; 13 other proposals for products liability reform have designated
offsetting behavior as irremediable,' 36 noting regrettably that "the human being
cannot be redesigned."' 37 Economic analyses of products liability rules have
also engaged with moral hazard and the costs associated with careful
behavior.138 For instance, consumers can reduce accidents by purchasing fewer
units of a product; if they insure against product-related accidents, however,
129. Geoffrey A. Manne, The Hydraulic Theory of Disclosure Regulation and Other Costs of
Disclosure, 58 ALA. L. REV. 473,487-88 (2007).
130. Todd J. Zywicki, An Economic Analysis of the Consumer Bankruptcy Crisis, 99 Nw. U.
L. REV. 1463, 1521-22 (2005).
131. See Benoit Monon & Dale T. Miller, Moral Credentials and the Expression of Prejudice,
81 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 33 (2001).
132. See George Lowenstein, Sunita Sah & Daylian M. Cain, The Unintended Consequences
of Conflict ofInterest Disclosure, 307 JAMA 669, 669 (2012).
133. Malani, supra note 19.
134. Robert Dan Spendlove, Note, Speed Bumps on the Road to Progress: How Product
Liability Slows the Introduction of Beneficial Technology-An Airbag Example, 13 GEO. MASON L.
REV. 1143, 1150 n.62 (2005-2006).
135. J. Gregg Miller, Jr., Risk Homeostasis and California Design Defect Products Liability:
Rethinking the Consumer Expectations and Risk-Benefit Tests, 32 U.S.F. L. REV. 587 (1998).
136. Bernstein, supra note 18, at 679.
137. Robert A. Prentice, "Tort Reform" and the Liability "Revolution ": Defending Strict
Liability in Tort for Defective Products, 27 GONz. L. REv. 251, 284 (1991-1992).





they may compensate for the reduced risk of loss by purchasing more product
units.139 Consumers may also purchase too many product units if they do not
bear the costs of possible harms to third parties, 1 a parallel to the "externally
hazardous" risk compensation discussed later in this Article.
Building on this scholarly groundwork, this Article advances legal inquiry
into risk compensation effects by categorizing several forms of risk
compensation behavior, highlighting the potential for variability in risk
compensation effects, and proposing legal strategies to identify and address risk
compensation behavior through FDA regulation.
II. When, Why, and How the Law Might Intervene in Risk Compensation
Behavior
In both popular and scholarly conversations, risk compensation behaviors
are viewed as problematic, and concerns about offsetting behavior have been
marshaled to argue against expanding access to efficacious health technologies.
Economic analyses have been more dispassionate, but although such analyses
do classify offsetting behavior as rational, few have suggested that it may also
be value-maximizing.141 This Part suggests that risk compensation is not only
rational, but also potentially optimal depending on individual preferences.
When risk compensation leads to harms, however, it may be justifiable for the
law to intervene. This Part will discuss four forms of risk compensation effects,
which present different normative bases for legal intervention.
When an individual engages in risk compensation as a response to the use
of a health and safety product, it is possible to classify these effects by several
criteria. First, we may organize effects on the basis of whether the individual
has perfect or imperfect information about risks and benefits. Second, we can
categorize effects based on whether the individual's new actual risk level,
including both product use and behavioral adjustments, is higher or lower than
it was before using the product (baseline risk). For the purposes of this
discussion, we will assume that actual risk that exceeds the baseline risk is
hazardous and undesirable. Third, we can identify whether the individual's new
actual risk matches his intended risk (the target risk level), and his intended
allocation of risks and benefits. We will assume that actual risk exceeding
one's target risk level is also undesirable, as is behaving in a way that is
inconsistent with one's optimal balance of risks and benefits. Finally, we can
139. Id. at 119. Incentives for consumer precautions also depend on available defenses for
manufacturers. If manufactuTers cannot raise the defense of contributory negligence, consumers may not
take precautions because they do not bear the complete risk of loss. But even when a defense of
contributory negligence is available, consumers who underestimate product risks will not take the
appropriate precautions. Id. at 121. This discussion aligns with the risk compensation model, which
depends on the perception of risk to motivate behavioral adjustments.
140. Id. at 122.
141. Spendlove's arguments are an exception. See supra note 134 and accompanying text.
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classify risk compensation effects based on the allocation of benefit and
harm-where risk compensation behavior increases harms relative to baseline
risk, are those harms borne by the individual (internal hazards), third parties
(external hazards), or both? This taxonomy yields four primary forms of risk
compensation behavior: perfectly informed risk compensation, uninformed
partial risk compensation, uninformed overcompensation, and externally
hazardous risk compensation (which may overlap with any of the former
categories).
A. Perfectly Informed Risk Compensation
People undertake risks for reasons-they obtain some utility from risky
behavior, and risk compensation will not occur if an individual lacks a reason
to increase his risk-taking.142 In short, it is a necessary precursor of risk
compensation that people would prefer to engage in riskier behaviors-they
expect rewards for taking more risks 43 -but they choose not to do so because
they fear incurring harm.1
When a new safety or health technology is available, users have access to
a larger set of behavioral options that are consistent with their level of
acceptable risk. Because the technology reduces the risk of harm, it creates a
protection surplus, which an informed individual can now allocate according to
his preferences. For example, assume that PrEP drugs reduce the risk of
acquiring HIV by approximately 70%. At one extreme, a PrEP user may retain
all this protection and make no change in his behavior, and he will be 70%
safer than he was before. At the other extreme, he may "spend" the entire
surplus by increasing his risk behaviors to the point of fully offsetting the
protection; he will be just as safe as he was before, but will capture 70% more
of the rewards of risky behavior. These rewards, for example, could include
greater relationship satisfaction and longevity, increased perceptions of trust
and intimacy between partners, or increased sexual pleasure.145 Between the
142. Hedlund, supra note 21, at 88.
143. See, e.g., WILDE, supra note 21, at 32.
144. A corollary of this theory is that risk compensation will not produce infinite increases in
risk behavior-users of health and safety products will only take more risks to the extent that they have
motivation to do so. This produces ceiling effects; for example, someone who is already behaving at a
maximally risky level will engage in less compensatory behavior, compared to someone whose baseline
behavior is inhibited by fear of risk.
145. See, e.g., Barry D. Adam, Alan Sears & E. Glenn Schellenberg, Accounting for Unsafe
Sex: Interviews with Men Who Have Sex with Men, 37 J. SEX REs. 24, 28 (2000) ("Unsafe sex ... within
an ongoing relationship . .. was viewed as a means of expressing or maintaining a feeling of intimacy or
romance."); Mary E. Randolph et al., Sexual Pleasure and Condom Use, 36 ARCHIVES SEXUAL BEHAV.
844 (2007) (describing reductions in sexual pleasure for protected sex compared to unprotected sex);
Tim Rhodes & Linda Cusick, Love and Intimacy in Relationship Risk Management: HIV Positive
People and Their Sexual Partners, 22 Soc. HEALTH & ILLNESS 1, 9 (2000) (explaining that among HIV-
positive individuals, "[i]ntimate relationships characterised by non-condom use were described as more
'complete' as well as more 'permanent"'); Teela Sanders, The Condom as Psychological Barrier:




two extremes-keeping or spending the entire protection surplus-the
individual could also choose a mixed allocation. For instance, he may choose to
engage in 20% more risk behavior, but also have 50% more protection from
HIV. If he is only motivated to increase his risk by 20%, this would mean that
he can completely satisfy his preferences while still remaining 50% safer than
he was before. The opportunity to completely satisfy one's behavioral
preferences is especially likely when health and safety technologies are highly
efficacious, meaning that the protection surplus is large.
In this view, risk compensation is potentially utility-maximizing-a route
to the fuller expression of behavioral preferences, and to the capture of value
that was previously too costly to access.146 Moreover, the value introduced by a
health and safety measure is not limited to the protection surplus. The
opportunity to decide how to divide this surplus is valuable in itself. When an
individual decides how to adjust his behavior in response to a health and safety
intervention, he exercises a new measure of decisional freedom, which could
add independent utility.147 We might also consider the extent to which the
opportunity to engage in risk compensation can influence beneficial ex ante
behavior. For instance, the motivation to increase one's risk behavior may be
one reason for purchasing and using new technologies in the first place.
on a series of interviews with female sex workers to conclude that "[i]n romantic relationships
unprotected sex symbolizes some form of trust and a separation from commercial sex").
146. The premise that individuals act rationally to maximize their utility has long been the
basic assumption of the Chicago School of economic theory. See, e.g., Gregory S. Crespi, Does the
Chicago School Need To Expand Its Curriculum?, 22 L. & Soc. INQUIRY 149, 150 (1997) (describing
the Chicago School premise "that all economic actors, whether individuals or other legal entities, can be
regarded as if they are engaging in rational maximization of their utility"); Robert A. Prentice, Chicago
Man, K-T Man, and the Future ofBehavioral Law and Economics, 56 VAND. L. REv. 1663, 1665 (2003)
(discussing the "Chicago-man," a "rational maximizer of his expected utilities"). Research in
psychology and behavioral economics has long ago eroded the assumption that individuals do indeed act
in rational ways to successfully achieve maximal utility. See, e.g., Daniel Kahneman & Richard H.
Thaler, Utility Maximization and Experienced Utility, 20 J. ECON. PERSPECTIVES 221 (2006) (describing
a series of studies documenting flaws in this model); Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, Prospect
Theory: An Analysis of Decision Under Risk, 47 ECONOMETRICA 263 (1979) (identifying a set of
"choice problems" revealing biases and deficiencies in utility theory). But although individuals may
predictably err in their attempts to pursue utility, "utility maximization is usefully thought of as a goal.
People are trying to make choices that will, on average, make them as well-off as possible.
Kahneman & Thaler, supra, at 231.
147. "[D]ecades of psychological theory and research ... [have] repeatedly demonstrated,
across many domains, a link between the provision of choice and increases in intrinsic motivation,
perceived control, task performance, and life satisfaction." Sheena S. Iyengar & Mark R. Lepper, When
Choice Is Demotivating: Can One Desire Too Much of a Good Thing?, 79 J. PERSONALITY & SOC.
PSYCHOL. 995, 995 (2000). Emerging evidence, however, suggests that there may be limits to the
benefits of choice. See, e.g., Barry Schwartz, Self-Determination: the Tyranny of Freedom, 55 AM.
PSYCHOL. 79 (2000) (identifying ways in which "unconstrained freedom" can undermine decisions and
satisfaction). For example, Iyengar and colleagues have identified a "choice overload" effect, by which a
larger number of choice options may undermine motivation and dissatisfaction. Iyengar & Lepper, supra
note 147, at 1003. The value of choice may also vary by culture and decision contexts. Simona Botti &
Sheena S. lyengar, The Psychological Pleasure and Pain of Choosing: When People Prefer Choosing at
the Cost ofSubsequent Outcome Satisfaction, 87 J. PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL. 312, 312-13 (2004).
Future research on risk compensation behavior should examine how individuals experience these
behavioral choices.
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Qualitative research has indicated that individuals' intentions to engage in more
unprotected sex may play an important role in creating user demand for an
efficacious HIV prevention vaccine. For products such as drugs, which often
require adherence to regular dosing regimens (e.g., a pill each day), intentions
to take risks may also motivate better adherence. In these ways, risk
compensation behavior may help drive markets for health and safety
technologies, as well as maintain the consistent and accurate use of these
products.
Under conditions of perfect information, a product user may adjust her
risk-taking precisely to her target risk level, enabling her to capture the
maximum allowable benefits of risk-taking behavior. If the user is rational, her
new risk level will be less than or equal to the baseline risk level, assuming her
preference for risk has not changed.14 9 This risk compensation behavior would
be either "partial" (the individual spends some of the protection surplus by
increasing her risk-taking) or "complete" (the individual spends the entire
protection surplus, resulting in a new risk level that is equal to baseline risk).
This condition, therefore, represents a net improvement over baseline, and it
matches the individual's intended risk. Internalized harms are absent in this
condition, although there may be externalized harms (to be discussed below).
When risk compensation does not yield net harm for the individual or for
others, there is no persuasive ethical justification to intervene coercively-even
if risk compensation entirely negates the benefits of a new technology. Those
who may engage in elevated risk behavior should not be disqualified from
accessing new health and safety technologies. If they are not harming others
and are cognizant of their own risks, they should retain freedom to access the
protection surplus and to allocate it as they choose. Even individuals with
complete knowledge about risk may rationally choose to engage in detrimental
health behaviors-and however much health advocates may try to change
individuals' preferences, they should remain free to make those choices. This
view may seem inimical to public health, but a normative defense of offsetting
behavior as promoting individual choice can bolster arguments for expanding
access to health technologies despite risk compensation concerns. 50
148, Newman et al., Preventive HIV Vaccine Acceptability, supra note 101.
149. Her new risk level may exceed the baseline risk level if her preference for risk has
increased. But under conditions of perfect information, this result would be attributable to the preference
change, not risk compensation effects.
150. For example, a 2012 editorial opposed FDA approval of Truvada@ for PrEP, arguing,
"Because many people will not take Truvada properly, but think they are protected, it is entirely likely
that widespread use of PrEP will actually increase HIV infections." Myers, supra note 7. This argument
assumes that individuals cannot understand the extent of PrEP's protection, the requirements of PrEP
use, or the HIV-related risks that they incur. There is no proof yet that these misconceptions exist. If we
instead allow that some users do understand PrEP and HIV risk accurately, risk compensation-based
objections simply announce a preference for allocating the entire protection surplus to a single type of
benefit (reduced risk of infection), rather than other potential benefits. If we cannot ensure that users will
spend the entire protection surplus on risk-reduction, this objection argues, it is preferable to withhold




Importantly, however, even risk compensation that is perfectly informed
and value-maximizing has implications for the financing of health and safety
products, which is largely the remit of private or public health insurers. Where
risk compensation does diminish or fully offset the expected pharmacological
impact of a drug, a healthcare payer may no longer find that drug cost-
effective. This is a classic problem of incentives; the user captures two kinds of
benefits (partial protection from disease, partial benefit from increasing risk
behaviors), but the healthcare payer only reaps financial rewards if the drug
actually prevents disease. If risk compensation results in perfect offsetting or
undermines cost-effectiveness too much, healthcare payers may decide to
refrain from paying full cost for this care, although making these decisions on a
case-by-case basis is problematic due to the problems of accurate detection and
the potential for abuse of discretion.
Although perfectly informed risk compensation behavior should not be
coercively prevented, such as by blocking product access, a concern for public
health would ethically justify efforts to non-coercively promote safer behaviors
among individuals using health and safety technologies. This is justified by the
imperative to ensure that public health resources are spent in a way that is
maximally effective. Non-coercive efforts to minimize rational risk
compensation behavior can help ensure that health and safety technologies
produce their intended gains. 151
B. Uninformed Partial Risk Compensation
Although risk compensation can be utility-maximizing, it may not always
be so. Product users may lack information about how products and their own
behaviors may affect their risks. Even when accurate information is available,
cognitive biases and neglect of certain risks can impair product users' ability to
appraise risks accurately. For instance, they may overestimate the benefits they
receive from an intervention, or underestimate the risks they continue to run
while using a health or safety product. Under these conditions, we might call
risk compensation behavior "uninformed."
Behavioral economics literature can help explain why we may
underestimate the risks and overestimate the protection we get from health and
safety technologies. Many studies have demonstrated the influence of optimism
bias, wherein people are overly optimistic regarding their vulnerability to
but it may not be the only (or most important) priority for individual users. Where prescription drugs
such as PrEP can increase utility in multiple ways, a respect for users' autonomy demands that we
acknowledge other benefits beyond risk reduction, and that we assure users a voice in decisions about
access. Objections to PrEP based on risk compensation threaten to bar access to an entire class of
individuals without acknowledging this implicit debasement of their values.
151. For instance, PrEP can be delivered along with behavioral counseling to minimize risk
compensation effects. Underhill et al., supra note 65; Kristen Underhill et al., Packaging PrEP To
Prevent HIV: An Integrated Framework To Plan for Pre-Exposure Prophylaxis in Clinical Practice, 55
J. ACQUIRED IMMUNE DEFICIENCY SYNDROMES 8, 8-13 (2010).
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adverse consequences.' 52 The effects of this bias may be compounded in risk
compensation behavior-an optimistic individual may not only underestimate
his risks, but also overestimate the protection provided by a preventive drug.
Bounded rationality will also affect our understanding of probabilistic
information about risk and drug efficacy; for instance, we tend to neglect
significant differences when dealing with low probabilities,153 and our
understanding of risk is sensitive to the way information about risks and
benefits is framed.154 When risks increase with repeated exposure (e.g.,
repeated sexual contacts), behavioral science literature suggests that we may
overestimate the probability that we will avoid risk in all of the exposures-
that is, we overestimate the probability of conjunctive events (I will avoid
infection in all three exposures) compared to disjunctive events (one of the
three exposures will result in infection). 55  We may also focus
disproportionately on certain risks due to availability biases, such as salience or
imaginability.'56 For example, someone who takes PrEP may be very focused
on the risk of HIV infection (which is reduced), but neglect the more likely
risks of infection with herpes or chlamydia (which are not reduced). And as
discussed above, perceptions of risk diminish as those risks become familiar, 57
and our perception of protection may be amplified or reinforced by feedback
over time. For instance, a football player wearing a helmet may experience
collisions as lower-impact, giving him motivation to hit as hard or harder in the
next tackle. 5 8
To compound the operation of cognitive biases, some health risk
behaviors take place when people are in states of (even further) diminished
rationality. For example, sexual risk-taking is influenced by the use of alcohol
and other substances,15 9 which can influence risk perception. Smoking
152. See, e.g., Neil D. Weinstein, Unrealistic Optimism About Future Life Events, 39 J.
PERSONALITY & SOCIAL PSYCHOL. 806 (1980); Christine Jolls et al., A Behavioral Approach to Law and
Economics, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1471 (1998) (addressing this and other biases); Barbara Luppi &
Francesco Parisi, Beyond Liability: Correcting Optimism Bias Through Tort Law, 35 QUEEN'S L.J. 47
(2009).
153. Cass R. Sunstein, Probability Neglect: Emotions, Worst Cases, and the Law, 113 YALE
L.J. 61 (2002).
154. Andrew J. Rothman & Peter Salovey, Shaping Perceptions To Motivate Healthy
Behavior: The Role of Message Framing, 121 PSYCHOL. BULL. 3 (1997); Amos Tversky & Daniel
Kahneman, The Framing ofDecisions and the Psychology ofChoice, 211 SCIENCE 453,453 (1981).
155. Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and
Biases, 185 SCIENCE 1124, 1129 (1974).
156. Id.
157. See supra note 50.
158. A.S. McIntosh, Risk Compensation, Motivation, Injuries, and Biomechanics in
Competitive Sport, 39 BRIT. J. SPORTS MED. 2, 2-3 (2005).
159. See, e.g., David D. Celentano, Amanda D. Latimore & Shruti H. Mehta, Variations in
Sexual Risks in Drug Users: Emerging Themes in a Behavioral Context, 5 CURRENT HIV/AIDS REP.
212, 217 (2010); William H. George & Susan A. Stoner, Understanding Acute Alcohol Effects on Sexual
Behavior, 11 ANN. REV. SEX RES. 92 (2000); William H. George, et al., Indirect Effects of Acute
Alcohol Intoxication on Sexual Risk Taking: The Role of Subjective and Physiological Sexual Arousal,




behaviors are also influenced by the use of alcohol.160 These and many other
health risk behaviors are also related to psychological conditions such as
depression or anxiety, and these psychological states can make it difficult to
appraise risks accurately. To further complicate the problem, perception of risk
can also vary in positive emotional states; for example, optimism bias may be
more pronounced among individuals in a good mood.16 1
Under conditions of imperfect information, an individual product user
who engages in risk compensation behavior may not accurately appraise his
new risk level. When "partial" risk compensation behavior occurs, the
individual's new risk level is an improvement over his baseline risk. When
"complete" risk compensation behavior occurs, the individual's new risk level
is equal to his baseline risk (but he is capturing more value from risk-taking
activities). In both of these scenarios, the individual is better off than he was at
baseline. 162 But in both situations, it is still possible for the individual's new
risk level to differ from his intended allocation of risks and benefits. This
difference may occur in either direction; with perfect information, he may
prefer to decrease his risk-taking to retain more of the protection surplus, or he
may prefer to increase his risk-taking to convert more of surplus into other
types of value.
Although uninformed partial or even uninformed complete risk
compensation behavior does not represent a net loss compared to baseline, this
outcome is undesirable; uninformed risk compensation is likely to be a net loss
compared to the individual's optimal allocation of risk and benefit. This
category of behavior may not demand a regulatory response on the basis of
preventing new harm, so long as it does not externalize harms to third parties.
But it may call for a regulatory response to remedy informational deficiencies,
in order to minimize the disparities between intended and actual risk.
C. Uninformed Overcompensation
When product users' information is incomplete, risk compensation
behavior may not always yield net benefits relative to baseline. In some
scenarios, an increase in risk-taking can overwhelm the protection surplus, a
phenomenon we may call "overcompensation." When this occurs, the product
user may overestimate and overspend the protection surplus, causing a net
deficit in protection compared to baseline. Assuming that the individual's
160. See, e.g., Mark B. Reed, ct al., The Relationship Between Alcohol Use and Cigarette
Smoking in a Sample of Undergraduate College Students, 32 ADDICTIVE BEHAv. 449 (2007).
161. See, e.g., Helga Fehr-Duda et al., Risk and Rationality: The Effects of Mood and Decision
Rules on Probability Weighting, 78 J. ECON. BEHAV. & ORG. 14 (2011); Gregory Mitchell, Why Law
and Economics' Perfect Rationality Should Not Be Traded for Behavioral Law and Economics' Equal
Incompetence, 91 GEO. LJ. 67, 101-02 (2002).
162. If the individual had achieved his target risk level at baseline, and if his target risk level
has not changed, his new actual risk level may be below the target risk level. But the allocation of risks
and benefits may still fall short ofthe allocation he would find optimal.
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preference for risk has remained constant, this represents a net loss compared
not only to her baseline risk, but also to her target risk level. In these cases, the
new product will do the user more overall harm than good, and she will be
unknowingly acting in ways that exceed her acceptable level of risk. This form
of risk compensation behavior can lead to adverse health consequences for the
intended beneficiaries of health and safety products. The remainder of this
Article will refer to this as uninformed overcompensation, where the user
herself incurs net harm.
Product features of a health or safety technology may contribute to
overcompensation behavior. Few drugs or safety products completely remove
risk; most are only partially efficacious for averting harm. When safety
products are of low efficacy, product users have a smaller protection surplus-
if they adjust their behaviors, they must do so within a narrower range, and it
may be more difficult to avoid overcompensating. Overcompensation may also
occur when a drug insulates against only one of several harmful consequences
of risky behavior, and when the user underestimates the additional harms.
Where uninformed overcompensation occurs, the intended beneficiaries of
health and safety products behave in ways that do not match their own
preferences regarding risk, and they incur unintended harm as a result of
product use. In this scenario, there are clear information asymmetries that may
justify legal efforts to interrupt risk compensation effects.16 3 Such efforts may
be viewed as paternalistic, but it is important to clarify that they do not seek to
change individuals' values; efforts to intervene in overcompensation seek to
bring individuals' behaviors closer to what they themselves would choose
given their target risk level and ideal allocation of risks and benefits.
D. Externally Hazardous Risk Compensation
Risky activities often pose risks for multiple parties. When one party
increases his or her risk-taking as a result of using a new health and safety
technology-whether the adjustment consists of perfectly informed risk
compensation, uninformed partial risk compensation, or uninformed
overcompensation-these behaviors may cause harm to others. To take
Peltzman's example, drivers who increase their "driving intensity" while using
seatbelts are not more likely to die in traffic accidents, but they are more likely
to kill pedestrians.'TM  In the same way, airbag laws may increase risks for
passengers and drivers of non-airbag-equipped vehicles, and auto insurance
163. This resonates with the "libertarian paternalism" emphasis of Sunstein and Thaler. Cass
R. Sunstein & Richard H. Thaler, Libertarian Paternalism Is Not an Oxymoron, 70 U. CHI. L. REv. 1167
(2003).
164. Peltzman, supra note 9, at 717.




laws may increase the likelihood that drivers and pedestrians will be hit. 166
People who decrease their use of condoms while taking PrEP may impose
greater risks on their sexual partners; people who smoke more cigarettes
because they are low-tar may impose additional risks of second-hand smoke;
people who increase their consumption of unhealthy foods while taking
medication for cholesterol may influence other family members to eat in
unhealthy ways. Even if these risk compensation behaviors are perfectly
informed and value-maximizing for product users, they externalize some harms
to non-users.
The line between internalized and externalized harms is not always clear.
Some harms imposed by suboptimal health behaviors may fall heavily on an
individual's family members. For example, an international study of smoke
exposure found that women and children who live with smokers have an
elevated risk of premature death due to second-hand smoke exposure. 167
Although these family members are third parties, their illness or death may be
devastating to the individual smoker. It may thus be inaccurate to classify these
harms as purely "externalized," and the balance of internal and external harms
should inform regulatory efforts to intervene in risk compensation effects. 168
The remaining sections in this Article will not repeat this caveat, but it should
be understood that externalized and internalized harms may in some cases
overlap.
In addition to the direct effects of increased risk-taking, risk compensation
behavior can also harm third parties indirectly by influencing social norms. For
example, consider a highway on which 30% of drivers are wearing seatbelts
and driving an additional 5 miles an hour over the speed limit. Those drivers
may exert sufficient influence on the drivers around them to raise everyone's
speed by a few miles an hour, even among drivers who are not wearing
seatbelts, due to the instinct to match the speed of surrounding traffic. The
drivers who are not wearing seatbelts are placed at higher risk when they
increase their speed, which will manifest itself at the population level as an
increase in injuries among this group. Even if it is perfectly rational for the
seatbelt-wearing drivers to increase their speed, the influence of these drivers
on social norms may lead to a net loss at the population level. In the same way,
if users of PrEP routinely decrease or stop the use of condoms, social norms in
the community may change to (further) stigmatize or disfavor condom use.
166. That is, because insured drivers do not bear the risk of an accident, they may drive less
carefully. Insurance laws yield an increase in the proportion of drivers who are insured, which in turn
may increase traffic fatalities. See Cohen & Dehejia, supra note 90, at 388.
167. Heather Wipfli, Secondhand Smoke Exposure Among Women and Children: Evidence
from 31 Countries, 98 Am. J. PUB. HEALTH 672, 672 (2008).
168. We might also consider the extent to which the benefits captured by risk compensation
behavior are shared with third parties. For example, passengers in a car benefit from the driver's speed,
all family members may enjoy unhealthy foods, and both members of a couple may enjoy unprotected
sex.
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This would make it difficult for nonusers to insist on condom use with their
sexual partners, which would yield increased rates of sexually transmitted
infection among this group. In each of these examples, risk compensation
behavior among the beneficiaries of a health or safety technology may lead to
harms incurred by non-beneficiaries.
Where risk compensation behavior leads to harms among third parties, the
balance of interests will be complex. This form of risk compensation behavior,
however, furnishes the strongest rationale for intervention, given concerns
about equity and the likelihood that transactions costs will prevent parties from
reaching other solutions. It is necessary in this case to weigh the benefits
accruing to product users against the type and extent of harm imposed on
others.
The remainder of this Article will group together uninformed
overcompensation and externally hazardous risk compensation, simply
classifying them as hazardous risk compensation effects. In these two
scenarios, risk compensation behavior may cause health and safety
technologies to produce net harms relative to baseline risk. Uninformed partial
or complete compensation is also suboptimal: although individuals in this
scenario do not experience harm compared to baseline, their actual allocation of
risk and benefit does not match their own preferences, and future
overcompensation is possible. Finally, only the narrow case of perfectly
informed risk compensation behavior without externalized harms could be
described as optimal.
E. Forms ofLegal Intervention
The scientific and legal literatures have yielded few ways to address
hazardous risk compensation effects (to minimize harm), uninformed partial
risk compensation effects (to amend information deficiencies), or perfectly
informed risk compensation behavior (to reduce the target risk level and
maximize intervention benefit). Depending on their severity, these effects may
call for regulation due to incomplete consumer information, the operation of
cognitive biases, transactions costs that may undermine private solutions to
externalized hazards, and the potential for population-level harms. Efforts to
address risk compensation effects through legal mechanisms could fall into
several categories with increasing levels of intrusiveness:169 (1) interventions
designed to identify risk compensation behavior, (2) informational
interventions to modify individual behaviors, (3) financial incentives to modify
169. I am grateful to Professor Bill Sage for suggesting this framework, which uses his work
on antibiotic resistance as a model. William M. Sage & David A. Hyman, Combating Antimicrobial
Resistance: Regulatory Strategies and Institutional Capacity, 84 TuL. L. REv. 781, 799-820 (2010)




individual behaviors, and (4) command-and-control regulation specifying
standards or conditions of product use.170
1. Identifying Risk Compensation Behavior
Before attempting to intervene in risk compensation dynamics, it is
necessary to understand the type and extent of the effect. Currently, little is
known about the factors that may drive risk compensation behavior as a
response to any given technology. The law offers opportunities to incentivize
the production of information about these effects, including public health
surveillance mechanisms, the funding of risk compensation research through
government grants, and the use of regulatory requirements to incentivize data
collection by product manufacturers. These strategies may help to overcome
current obstacles to rigorous research on risk compensation behavior, which
may include a scarcity of funding, a lack of interest or knowledge among
manufacturers and healthcare payers, and a tendency to focus exclusively on
product efficacy without considering product use as a behavioral phenomenon.
If legal structures could be used to incentivize data collection regarding risk
compensation behavior, these data may help us maximize product
effectiveness, increase cost-effectiveness, and minimize product-related harms.
2. Informational Interventions to Modify Individual Behaviors
Where risk compensation effects arise, the least intrusive intervention is
the provision of warnings to encourage users to modify their behavior.' 7' Legal
mechanisms such as required disclosures and product labeling are well-suited
to intervene in this way. For instance, product labels or required patient
counseling could emphasize imperfect product efficacy or direct users to
behave in safer ways regardless of product use. Another option is to
specifically warn product users about tendencies to engage in risk
compensation behavior, although the efficacy of this approach is uncertain.172
Where risk compensation harms are wholly or partially attributable to cognitive
biases, a variety of specific messaging strategies are available to counteract
them. Professors Christine Jolls and Cass Sunstein have proposed providing
170. Risk compensation harms may also be reduced through interventions that aim to limit
risk-taking overall, such as by incentivizing safer behaviors or reducing the motivation to take risks.
Wilde has enumerated strategies for reducing risk behavior by influencing motivation, such as efforts to
increase the perceived costs of risky behavior. WILDE, supra note 21, at 195, 202-07. Legal research is
similarly full of efforts to limit risk-taking and incentivize care; these efforts, however, are ways of
changing the target risk level, rather than intervening specifically in the risk compensation mechanism.
171. See Christine Jolls & Cass R. Sunstein, Debiasing Through Law, 35 J. LEGAL STUD. 199,
207 (2006).
172. Evidence to support the strategy of instructing people directly about cognitive biases is
mixed. See, e.g., Stephen J. Choi & A.C. Pritchard, Behavioral Economics and the SEC, 56 STAN. L.
REV. 1, 66-68 (2003); Cassandra Burke Robertson, Judgment, Identity, and Independence, 42 CONN. L.
REv. 1, 34-35 (2009).
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people with information about "a concrete incidence" of a risk materializing, 173
and they have reviewed methods of framing information to emphasize the
potential costs of unsafe behavior.' 74 Framing strategies are promising,
although it may also be important to monitor the extent to which such messages
may inadvertently undermine the consistent use of health and safety
technologies.
Deception strategies may be a tempting way to minimize hazardous risk
compensation effects-for example, by conveying the message that health and
safety products are less efficacious than they actually are, or by providing such
products without alerting consumers (e.g., requiring that new cars be outfitted
with airbags or braking systems without informing car purchasers). However,
deception strategies are practically, ethically, and legally unacceptable in
medical treatment and consumer safety. For example, the provision of
deceptive information about drug effects would undermine informed consent to
medical treatment,175 which should entail the provision of "unbiased
information on the risks and benefits of all treatment options."l 7 6 Undermining
patients' expectations of drug efficacy may also result in poor drug adherence
or lower levels of uptake, including among patients who would not have
overcompensated if they had been given accurate information. More generally,
false advertising regulations and product labeling requirements prevent the
provision of information that misstates product efficacy or obscures safety
characteristics, even if such messages help avert behaviorally induced harms.
Furthermore, many products cannot be used without active user participation,
and it would be impossible to introduce even passive safety measures such as
airbags without consumers' awareness.
Beyond the provision of warnings, informational strategies to influence
users' behavior could include monitoring and publicizing risk compensation
effects, possibly aggregated on the basis of drug, prescriber, or pharmacy. This
mechanism may be useful for both identifying behavior and motivating
behavioral change directly,177 as well as incentivizing prescribers and providers
to address risk compensation in their own practices. Even simply assessing self-
reported user behavior on a regular basis could help users to remain mindful of
their behavioral adjustments. Privacy concerns loom large in this proposal;
where behaviors are private, such as sexual activity, and/or highly stigmatizing,
such as substance use, interventions that rely on publicizing information may
173. Jolls & Sunstein, supra note 171, at 210 (citing studies).
174. Id. at 210-11. In the psychology and health behavior literature, this is known as loss- and
gain-framing. See, e.g., Rothman & Salovey, supra note 154.
175. For an overview of the legal and ethical obligations of informed consent, see Jaime
Staples King & Benjamin W. Moulton, Rethinking Informed Consent: The Case for Shared Medical
Decision-Making, 32 AM. J.L. & MED. 429 (2006).
176. Id. at 436-37.
177. See Sage & Hyman, supra note 169, at 801 (noting that public reporting/disclosure




be unacceptable. This may even be true when data are publicized in aggregate.
A less public strategy may be to collect behavioral data, then provide users with
private feedback on their risk behavior in comparison to other product users.
Any such strategy, however, would rely on users to accurately report behaviors,
introducing a variety of biases. Informational strategies that aim to influence
risk compensation behavior by product users require rigorous empirical study,
but are appealing because they may be less intrusive than manipulating
financial incentives or restricting product access.
3. Financial Incentives to Modify Individual Behaviors
A variety of financial options may be used to motivate behavioral change,
as discussed by other scholars.179 Where risk compensation behavior imposes
external harms, one remedy may be to tax the product in such a way that
requires users to internalize these harms (Pigouvian taxation). 80 It is also
possible to combine taxation with warnings to encourage individuals to attend
to risks they might otherwise underestimate.' 8 1 For example, individuals
purchasing statins could receive a dietary warning and pay a higher co-pay.
Because the demand for prescription drugs may be relatively inelastic, it may
be most sensible to tax all purchases of a given drug, then to use that revenue to
reduce the harms associated with risk compensation behavior.1
A potentially more intrusive, financially-driven option would be to ask
drug users to sign a private commitment contract through the online service
StickK.com to commit to certain behaviors as a condition of product use, in
which the user would forfeit money if those behaviors were not maintained. 18
A number of health behavior interventions have tested the use of financial
incentives to encourage desirable behaviors;' 85 these programs have raised
178. For example, providing individuals with feedback about their energy consumption
relative to other customers has been shown to reduce consumption. Ian Ayres, Sophie Raseman & Alice
Shih, Evidence from Two Large Field Experiments That Peer Comparison Feedback Can Reduce
Residential Energy Usage, J.L. ECON. & ORG. 1 (2012).
179. See, e.g., Sage & Hyman, supra note 169, at 803-15 (describing multiple options for the
design of financial incentives to reduce behaviors associated with antimicrobial resistance).
180. Id. at 806.
181. Id.
182. Financial incentives may have limited power to influence behavior among users of
prescription drugs when users are insulated from health care costs by insurance. For example, if an
insurance company finances statins without a co-pay, statin users may not be influenced by co-pay rules.
183. Sage & Hyman, supra note 169, at 806.
184. See STicKK, http://www.stickk.com/ (last visited Aug. 5, 2012). An individual signing a
StickK contract sets a behavioral goal, a deadline by which she commits to achieve that goal, and a
financial penalty to pay in the event of failure. If she fails to achieve her goal in the allotted timeline, the
StickK website will charge her credit card for the penalty she has set. For an example of a StickK
contract process, see IAN AYRES, THE $500 DIET: WEIGHT LOSS FOR PEOPLE WHO ARE COMMITTED TO
CHANGE (2011).
185. For a review of financial incentives for behavior change, see Kim Sutherland, Jon B.
Christianson & Sheila Leatherman, Impact of Targeted Financial Incentives on Personal Health
Behavior: A Review of the Literature, 65 MED. CARE RES. & REV. 36S (2008).
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important questions about sustainability, autonomy, paternalism,
discrimination, and the role of intrinsic motivation.' 86 Unfortunately, however,
individual-level strategies may also diminish user demand for health and safety
products, as well as deterring potential users who would not have engaged in
hazardous risk compensation behavior.
Regulatory efforts can also include financial incentives for private and
public researchers to develop strategies for identifying and minimizing risk
compensation effects. These may consist of prizes for developing interventions
that reduce risk compensation behavior,' 8 7 grant funding for research, or patent
extensions or priority review vouchers1 89 for manufacturers who successfully
minimize risk compensation behavior among drug users.
4. Command-and-Control Regulations
When risk compensation effects are hazardous and efforts to modify user
behavior are unsuccessful, the most intrusive legal response is to specify
standards for product use, prescription, and access. These are "command-and-
control" regulations: rules that "require or proscribe specific conduct" on
penalty of fines, injunctions, and other enforcement consequences.190 For the
present case of prescription drugs, the FDA's imposition of warning and
labeling requirements can also be classified as command-and-control
regulation, given that labeling is mandatory for drug sale.' 9' But beyond
warnings, this category of regulation could also include withholding products
from all or some users, or withdrawing drug approval if risk compensation
reaches the very high bar of being so hazardous as to outweigh the benefits of
an intervention at the population level. Even then, it is unlikely that every
individual who uses a product will engage in hazardous behavior; risk
compensation may be less pronounced among those who are more risk-averse,
or who lack the motivation to increase their risk-taking. It could be unjust to
186. For some discussion of these issues, see IAN AYRES, CARROTS AND STICKS: UNLOCK THE
POWER OF INCENTIVES To GET THINGS DONE (2010); Kristin M. Madison, Kevin G. Volpp & Scott D.
Halpern, The Law, Policy, and Ethics ofEmployers' Use ofFinancial Incentives To Improve Health, 39
J.L. MED & ETHICS 450 (2011); Adam Oliver & Lawrence D. Brown, A Consideration of the User
Financial Incentives To Address Health Inequalities, 37 J. HEALTH POL. POL'Y & L. 201 (2012).
187. See, e.g., Sage & Hyman, supra note 169, at 810 (describing the use of prizes to reward
innovation).
188. Id.at811.
189. Id. at 810 (describing the use of priority review vouchers as an incentive for
manufacturers).
190. Richard B. Stewart, Regulation, Innovation, and Administrative Law: A Conceptual
Framework, 69 CAL. L. REv. 1256, 1264 (1981); see also Jon D. Hanson & Kyle D. Logue, The Costs
of Cigarettes: The Economic Case for Ex Post Incentive-Based Regulation, 107 YALE L.J. 1163, 1174-
75 (1998) (describing the difference between command-and-control regulations and incentive-based
regulations).
191. See, e.g., Jon D. Hanson & Kyle D. Logue, Smokers' Compensation: Toward a Blueprint
for Federal Regulation of Cigarette Manufacturers, 22 S. ILL. U. L.J. 519, 524 n. 19 (classifying FDA




deny such consumers products that would increase their overall utility, simply
because other consumers might cause hazards. This scenario would lead to
difficult decisions about regulation, especially when it is difficult or impossible
to differentiate between users who are likely or unlikely to cause risk
compensation-related harms.
One option is to tailor product marketing or partially limit access to
certain users. For example, it may be possible to assess users' behaviors during
product use, and to intensify the provision of counseling and warnings to
individuals who exhibit hazardous risk compensation behavior. If efforts to
minimize risk compensation hazards are unavailing, and if hazardous risk
compensation is sustained over time, it may be justifiable to limit product
access. Private and public healthcare payers might also withhold payment for
health technologies if individuals do not commit to behaviors that make such
interventions cost-effective. But this introduces the potential for abuse of
discretion in deciding who receives prescriptions or insurance coverage for new
technologies, which would make a selective limitation strategy problematic.
Another clear limitation of individual-level access policies is the need to rely
on self-reported user behavior, and users may be unwilling to report behaviors
accurately if they run the risk of losing product access. This may also
incentivize the reporting of extremely high-risk behaviors before product use,
so that subsequent behaviors will be ascribed to ordinary risk-taking rather than
risk compensation effects. Finally, a third serious defect of individual-level
access limitations is that they may unfairly punish unrelated increases in risk-
taking as hazardous risk compensation behavior. For example, consider
someone with high cholesterol who is prescribed statins. At his next checkup,
he may report consuming far more cholesterol-rich foods, and his weight may
increase. These results are consistent with risk compensation, but they may
instead have been driven by an increase in his target risk level-for instance, he
may have decided that his high cholesterol is inevitable, and that it was no
longer worthwhile to watch his diet carefully. Or, he may have increased his
consumption of cholesterol-rich foods for another unrelated reason, such as
moving to a neighborhood where access to healthy food is poor. These
behaviors may appear to be risk compensation, but, in fact, they had little to do
with whether he was taking statins. Moreover, taking the statin drugs away
from this user would leave him without an efficacious prevention tool, while
doing little to reverse his increased risk-taking behavior.
Instead of basing access on individuals' self-reported behaviors, an
alternative is to limit access to groups according to a blanket policy based on
population-level research evidence. It may be impossible to reliably identify
risk compensation behavior at the level of the individual. But in a large enough
sample of users, individual variations in the target risk level over time should
have a minimal influence on the data, allowing risk compensation effects to be
isolated with greater certainty. Group-level policies run the risk of being
discriminatory, so it is crucial that any such policy be based entirely on
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empirical evidence. Even an evidence-based group-level policy is also
imperfect: it is unfair to members of such groups who would not actually have
engaged in risk compensation, but who fall on the wrong side of the access line.
But although group-level policies may be unfair to some potential users, they
may cause marginally less harm than individual-level policies, for the reasons
described above.
F Prescription Drugs as a Test Case
The remaining Parts address how legal intervention may help to address
risk compensation dynamics related to prescription drug use. As noted in the
introduction, prescription drugs present an optimal test case for these forms of
legal intervention. The law governing prescription drugs already furnishes
means of obtaining information from drug manufacturers, influencing user
behavior through risk management plans and FDA-enforced warnings, and
controlling access to prescription drugs through FDA regulation.
As a preliminary point, it is possible to conceptualize drug-related risk
compensation behavior in several ways. First, offsetting behavior could itself
be seen as a non-pharmacological effect of the drug. But this view would
sideline the complex social and behavioral processes driving risk compensation
behavior-for instance, the formation of expectations about a drug's efficacy,
the use of the drug, and the subsequent perception of protection. Second,
offsetting behavior could be viewed as an independent decision made by drug
consumers, deriving from individual preferences and unaffected by any
characteristic of the product. However, this view may neglect opportunities to
adapt the design and marketing of products to help consumers avoid hazardous
or uninformed risk compensation behavior, and to thereby maximize drug
effectiveness and cost-effectiveness.
A third way, and the most helpful for this discussion, is to view risk
compensation behavior as a predictable causal mechanism by which a drug has
an effect, where the effect is a change in users' risk of incurring adverse health
consequences.192 This allows for complexity in the risk compensation
mechanism, but preserves incentives for drug manufacturers, regulators, and
intermediaries to identify and address offsetting behaviors. Users who engage
in risk compensation and experience adverse health effects may also seek to
place responsibility for those effects with drug manufacturers and prescribers.
Although many features of risk compensation are beyond manufacturers'
control, product labeling and advertising will doubtless help to shape the
perceptions of drug users. Product use is also a but-for cause of risk
compensation behavior. It may therefore be appropriate to structure legal
414
192. The changed risk would arise not from changed vulnerability to harm, but rather from a
change in frequency of exposure to harm through risk behavior.
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incentives to encourage drug manufacturers and other actors to identify and
seek to minimize risk compensation and its associated harms. 193
III. Identifying Drug-Associated Risk Compensation Effects: FDA-Required
Testing
Administrative law offers several mechanisms for incentivizing
manufacturers to investigate risk compensation behavior, both before and after
marketing new drugs. These data could inform guidelines for drug prescription
and clinical follow-up, labeling and approval, the development of behavioral
interventions to mitigate risk compensation effects, cost-effectiveness
calculations, and the efforts of public health authorities to anticipate shifts in
disease burden and healthcare costs. Analyses to identify risk compensation
behavior are not routine; the FDA does not currently consider effects derived
from user expectations in any phase of the drug approval process. 19 4 However,
testing for risk compensation effects is feasible and should play a role in FDA
requirements for drug approval and postmarketing testing.' 9 5
The FDA requires drug manufacturers to collect and present specific
forms of data about drug safety and efficacy, both before and after drug
approval. Minor changes to FDA requirements could ensure that data on users'
behavioral adjustments are included at both time points.
A. Pre-Approval Testing
Current FDA requirements for new drug approvals do not incentivize the
collection of data on risk compensation behaviors. In order to approve a New
Drug Application, the FDA requires three sequential phases of clinical
evidence, none of which assesses risk compensation behaviors. Phase I
identifies a new drug's pharmacological effects and safety in approximately 20-
80 "patients or normal volunteer subjects";19 6 Phase II consists of a controlled
clinical study to assess efficacy of the drug for a particular indication in several'
193. Because risk compensation is behavioral, it could also be perceived as a form of drug
misuse or abuse. If the label specifically warns patients to avoid increased behavioral risk-taking, risk
compensation behavior may be perceived variously as unapproved use, off-label use, drug abuse, or
misuse-each ofwhich carries specific consequences in drug regulation.
194. See, e.g., Malani, supra note 19, at 436.
195. Many states also impose on drug manufacturers an independent "duty to test" for adverse
effects that are foreseeable based on the current state of scientific knowledge, discoveries, and advances.
See, e.g., Enright by Enright v. Eli Lilly & Co., 570 N.E.2d 198 (N.Y. 1991). FDA approval does not
insulate a drug manufacturer from liability for negligently failing to test for foreseeable and
scientifically discoverable product dangers. See Stromsodt v. Parke-Davis & Co., 257 F. Supp. 991
(D.N.D. 1966), affd, 411 F.2d 1390 (8th Cir. 1969). This duty should arguably extend to the
identification of risk compensation effects, but this assessment is beyond the scope of this paper. Risk
compensation testing may also form part of a broader duty of "product stewardship," although this broad
duty has been controversial. See Lars Noah, Platitudes About 'Product Stewardship' in Torts:
Continuing Drug Research and Education, 15 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REv. 359, 360 (2009).
196. 21 C.F.R. § 312.21(a) (2011).
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hundred patients for whom the drug is expected to provide a therapeutic
benefit; and Phase III consists. of randomized trials among hundreds or
thousands of patients, intended to identify drug effectiveness in a more routine
clinical setting. 197 The FDA generally requires two or more Phase III studies
before approving a New Drug Application, although studies in Phases II and III
may be combined in a fast-track approach for drugs for serious or life-
threatening illness, with increased post-marketing surveillance. 98
The double-blinded, randomized trial designs required in Phases II and III
are profoundly limited in identifying risk compensation effects, as described
above.199 However, it may also be too burdensome to add a separate,
freestanding study to assess risk compensation behavior before drug ap roval:
delays in the FDA approval process have received extensive attention, 3 and
even hazardous risk compensation may not be severe enough to merit
additional delay. One potential solution to the lack of evidence is to change
FDA requirements to include studies with different probabilities of assignment
to treatment groups.201 Simply adding several supplementary analyses in the
FDA's existing requirements, however, may also improve the assessment of
risk compensation without manipulating assignment probabilities.
One possibility is to conduct a combination of longitudinal analyses and
qualitative interviews. Researchers could assess the risk behaviors of all
participants before and during the trial, and track any changes over time.
Adverse changes in risk behavior over time may be due to expectations of
benefit from the medications; even though this design could not conclusively
identify risk compensation as the causal mechanism for such changes, the
finding of increased risk behavior would be a useful prompt for further
investigation.202 Conducting qualitative interviews with trial participants to
explore their perceptions of pill efficacy could also help identify how these
expectations shaped behavior throughout the study.
A more promising option is to compare participants based on their self-
reported expectations of drug effectiveness. Researchers could ask participants
which group they believe they are in, and whether they believe they are taking
an efficacious drug. It would then be possible to compare the behaviors of
197. See 21 C.F.R. § 312.21 (2011) (overview of FDA investigational phases); see also
Malani, supra note 19, at 436; Judy Vale, Expanding Expanded Access: How the Food and Drug
Administration Can Achieve Better Access to Experimental Drugs for Seriously Ill Patients, 96 GEO. L.J.
2143, 2147-48 (2008).
198. See Vale, supra note 197, at 2148; see also 21 C.F.R. § 314.500-560 (2011) (governing
accelerated FDA approval for drugs intended to treat serious or life-threatening illnesses).
199. See supra Subsection I.B.L
200. See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, Beyond the Precautionary Principle, 151 U. PA. L. REV.
1003, 1023 (2003).
201. See Malani, supra note 19; Malani, supra note 70.
202. An even better strategy for this goal would be to include a third study arm that received
no treatment-not even placebo-and compare the active and placebo arm against this no-treatment





participants who were confident they were receiving a beneficial drug, against
participants who were confident that they were receiving an inefficacious drug
or placebo.20 3 Limitations of this study design would include potential
confounding due to optimism bias (among other confounders); more optimistic
participants may be more likely to believe they are in the active arm, as well as
more likely to overestimate the benefits of an active drug. Another weakness is
the fact that even participants who believed they received an efficacious drug
would lack information about the actual effect. However, this comparison may
yield a closer approximation of risk compensation than is possible in a pre-post
comparison.204 Each of these analyses would place some burden on drug
developers-namely, the requirement of adding behavioral questionnaires,
qualitative interviews, and questions to ask about participants' perception of
treatment assignment and drug benefit. However, this burden is minimal
compared to the need for an entirely separate study.
Regardless of methodology, pre-approval analyses will not be perfectly
applicable to users who begin taking the drug after it is approved, since users
outside trials will receive information stating that the drug is effective. These
changes, however, could help to flag risk compensation behavior early,
indicating a greater need to conduct postmarketing surveillance of user
behavior.
B. Postmarketing Surveillance
The FDA could also prompt the collection of data on risk compensation
effects after approval. The decision to require these studies should be subject to
specific and empirically derived criteria for determining when risk
compensation is a legitimate concern, such as when it is observed in pre-
approval studies. After drug approval, the FDA engages in postmarketing
surveillance "to detect adverse events not previously observed, improve
understanding of the potential severity of previously unanticipated risks, detect
events resulting from drug interactions or drug effects in particular populations,
and assess the potential for causal relationships." 20 5 Sources of information in
postmarketing studies include mandatory reporting of adverse events by
manufacturers (including reports drawn from medical literature), monitoring
the medical literature, soliciting reports of adverse events from health
professionals, and, on occasion, requiring that manufacturers conduct
203. I have suggested this design in more detail elsewhere. Underhill, supra note 65;
Underhill, supra note 64.
204. A pre-post comparison is like the longitudinal analysis described in the prior paragraph,
in which researchers measure participant behavior before and after an intervention takes place, but
without a control group.
205. Catherine T. Struve, The FDA and the Tort System: Postmarketing Surveillance,
Compensation, and the Role ofLitigation, 5 YALE J. HEALTH POL'Y, L. & ETHiCs 587, 600 (2005); see
also Eva B. Stensvad, Immunity for Vaccine Manufacturers: The Vaccine Act and Preemption of Design
Defect Claims, 95 MINN. L. REv. 315, 340 n.196 (2010) (citing additional commentary).
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postmarketing clinical studies (Phase IV studies to further assess "serious
206
risk[s]") as a condition of drug approval. Postmarketing studies are intended
to provide more information about specific drug effects, and before drug
approval, "any interested person" may propose that the FDA require an
additional or continued postmarketing study.207 The FDA's authority to
mandate postmarketing studies and "risk evaluation and mitigation strategies"
(REMS) was expanded in 2007 and took effect in March 2008; the Food and
Drug Administration Amendments Act (FDAAA) explicitly recognized FDA
authority to require a postapproval study to assess "serious risks," on penalty of
208drug withdrawal from the marketplace. The FDA most recently reported to
Congress on outstanding postmarketing studies in March 2012; according to the
most current data available at this time, 198 approved New Drug Applications
and Abbreviated New Drug Applications had an outstanding mandatory
postmarketing study requirement or voluntary postmarketing study
209commitment2. These commitments included 675 unmet or pending
postmarketing requirements, and 75 requirements that had been met within the
past year.210
Data collected after drug approval would be most useful for assessing risk
compensation effects, because users of approved drugs will have justifiably
higher expectations of benefitting from the product. At present, however,
neither postmarketing surveillance of adverse events nor Phase IV studies are
designed to reach risk compensation behavior. Mandatory reporting of adverse
206. See Struve, supra note 205 (reviewing the FDA's postmarketing surveillance system); see
also 21 U.S.C. § 355(o)(3)(B) (2007) (permitting the Secretary to require postapproval studies "(i) To
assess a known serious risk related to the use of the drug ... (ii) To assess signals of serious risk related
to the use of the drug . . . (iii) To identify an unexpected serious risk when available data indicates the
potential for a serious risk"). "Serious risk" refers to the risk of an adverse drug experience that results
in death, risk of death, inpatient hospitalization, persistent incapacity to carry on normal life functions,
birth defect, or that "based on appropriate medical judgment, may jeopardize the patient and may require
a medical or surgical intervention to prevent these consequences." 21 U.S.C. § 355-1(b)(4)-(5) (2007).
Uninformed overcompensation may not immediately pose this severe level of harm; however, because it
can cause harm and cannot be assessed thoroughly in preapproval studies, it is appropriate to require
postmarketing studies for this purpose.
207. 21 C.F.R. § 310.303(b) (2011).
208. See Food and Drug Administration Amendments Act, Pub. L. No. 110-85, § 901, 121
Stat. 823, 922-43 (2007); Jacqueline R. Berman, FDA's Increasing Role in Post-Approval Control over
Pharmaceutical Products, 12 J. HEALTH CARE COMPLIANCE 31 (2010).
209. FDA, REPORT ON THE PERFORMANCE OF DRUG AND BIOLOGICS FIRMS IN CONDUCTING
POSTMARKETING REQUIREMENTS AND COMMITMENTS; AVAILABILITY, 77 Fed. Reg. 13,339, 13,341
(Mar. 6, 2012), available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-2012-03-06/pdf/2012-5302.pdf.
210. Id. More recent data are available in the Postmarketing Requirements and Commitments
Database File, which is up to date as of October 2012 (but does not disaggregate voluntary and
mandatory commitments). This file lists 1036 commitments for 219 drugs approved since March 25,
2008, of which 214 commitments had been terminated, submitted, fulfilled, or released. The remaining
822 were open, pending, or delayed. The number of study commitments per year was 112 from March to
December 2008, 225 in 2009, 256 in 2010, 261 in 2011, and 182 in January to October 2012. FDA,





events according to 21 C.F.R. § 314.80(a) extends to "adverse drug
experience[s]" identified in any source, including medical practice, the
scientific literature, postmarketing studies. These are "any adverse event[s]
associated with the use of a drug in humans"; 211 however, the FDA's definition
for postmarketing reports does not specifically mention adverse behavioral
212effects other than drug abuse or overdose. Revising adverse event reporting
requirements to include increased behavioral risk-taking and associated
consequences would be one way to improve these regulations. Phase IV clinical
studies could also be designed to collect behavioral data in some of the ways
mentioned above, such as by comparing product users to matched controls who
receive no treatment, comparing behaviors before and during product use,213 or
combining qualitative interviews with behavioral assessments to understand
how users' perceptions of benefit might influence risk-taking. Although these
studies are not currently routine, the FDA could use both postmarketing
surveillance and the postmarketing study commitment mechanism to promote
the investigation of risk compensation effects. There is already some indication
that the FDA is interested in the collection of postmarketing data on risk
compensation behavior. The approval of Truvada for use as PrEP was
conditional on several postmarketing studies, including the validation of an
adherence questionnaire that will assess "sexual and non-sexual behaviors
related to increased risk of HIV infection." 2 14
Admittedly, the FDA's capacity to collect postmarketing data on risk
compensation behavior is limited. The FDA system for postmarketing
surveillance and monitoring Phase IV studies has been heavily criticized, and
commentators assert that the agency prioritizes new drug applications while
lacking the resources needed to process and respond to the "deluge of
information" it receives regarding adverse events-already more than 200,000
adverse event reports per year regarding drugs and biologic products, and over
21580,000 reports regarding medical devices. If clinicians who monitor patients
do not consistently ask about health behaviors, or if patients do not report them
accurately, hazardous or uninformed risk compensation effects may not be
detected. Furthermore, even if risk compensation effects are detected, they may
be perceived as a problem of personal responsibility rather than as reportable
adverse events attributable to product use. Phase IV studies required by the
FDA may not be conducted; one report suggested in 2002 that only 37% of all
211. 21 C.F.R. § 314.80(a) (2011).
212. Id.
213. For an example of this study design, see Martin et al., supra note 74.
214. Letter from FDA to Dara Wambach, Associate Director, Regulatory Affairs, Gilead
Sciences Inc., Re: Supplement Approval, 8 (July 16, 2012), http://www.accessdata.fda.gov/drugsatfda
docs/appletter/ 2012/0217520riglsO3Oltr.pdf.
215. Struve, supra note 205, at 601 (citing additional commentary); see also 21 C.F.R. §
310.303(a) (2011) ("[T]he Food and Drug Administration may approve the new drug application on
condition that the necessary long-term studies will be conducted and the results recorded and reported in
an organized fashion.").
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FDA-required postmarketing studies had been completed, and many had not
begun.216 Commentators also note that the FDA lacks a "systematic approach to
identifying possible pre-marketing drug-safety problems and translating them
into high-quality post-marketing studies." 217 As mentioned above, the
monitoring of risk compensation effects will also be limited by privacy
concerns and the validity of self-reported data on behaviors. These concerns
may vary depending on the type of drug and behavior at issue, and each context
may demand a different balance of privacy and rigorous postmarketing
research.
Despite these limitations, however, the FDA could still do more to
incentivize the collection of data on risk compensation behavior during the
postmarketing phase. Explicitly revising 21 C.F.R. § 314.80(a) and expanding
requests for postmarketing study commitments could together focus
manufacturers' attention on this goal, even if the FDA cannot ensure complete
enforcement. Administrative attention and explicit acknowledgement of risk
compensation effects may also incentivize independent researchers to
undertake behavioral studies of product users, bringing risk compensation
effects to the attention of research funders such as the National Institutes of
Health.218
IV. Modifying Prescription Drug Users' Behavior: FDA Labeling and REMS
Requirements
To address the adverse health effects posed by hazardous or uninformed
risk compensation effects, drug manufacturers should have incentives to
mitigate these dangers. This Part will explore two legal mechanisms that the
FDA can use to influence users' behavior: FDA-required labeling and REMS
requirements. Because this Article focuses on FDA regulation, this section will
216. Struve, supra note 205, at 605-06 n.85 (citing Marie R. Griffin et al., Commentary:
Postmarketing Surveillance for Drug Safety: Surely We Can Do Better, 75 CLINICAL PHARMACOLOGY
& THERAPEUTICS 491, 492 (2004)); see also Bruce Patsner, Marketing Approval Versus Cost of New
Medical Technologies in the Era of Comparative Effectiveness: CMS, Not FDA, Will Be the Primary
Player, 3 J. HEALTH & LIFE SCI. L. 38, 49 (2010) ("The FDA has not been able to enforce
standing Phase IV commitments by sponsors for drugs approved for marketing under accelerated
approval programs in more than 90 percent of cases . . . .").
217. Bruce M. Psaty & Sheila P. Burke, Protecting the Health ofOur Public-Institute of
Medicine Recommendations on Drug Safety, 355 NEw ENG. J. MED. 1753, 1754 (2006); see also INST.
OF MED., THE FUTURE OF DRUG SAFETY: PROMOTING AND PROTECTING THE HEALTH OF THE PUBLIC 17
(Alina Baciu et al. eds., 2007) ("FDA does not have adequate resources or procedures for translating
preapproval safety signals into effective postmarketing studies .... .") .
218. The NIH has funded several studies in this area, including my own work (National
Institute of Mental Health, Grant #5KOlMHI093273). A search of the NIH Research Portfolio Online
Reporting Tools grant database identifies 12 currently active grants that specifically refer to risk
compensation behavior. An additional 181 active grants include the term "behavioral disinhibition," but
this term is used in a variety of different ways and does not always refer to the mechanism of interest
here. See Research Porfolio Online Reporting Tools, NAT'L INST. OF HEALTH, http://projectreporter.





not discuss financial strategies for modifying users' behaviors, such as product
pricing or taxation.
Where risk compensation has been observed, the FDA should address
these concerns through labels intended for both patients and intermediaries, and
manufacturers may take additional steps to maximize drug effectiveness
through an FDA-approved REMS. Fulfilling this duty may help reduce
hazardous or uninformed risk compensation effects and maximize the benefit
from new drugs, while avoiding the more intrusive path of restricting access.
Although warnings impose costs on manufacturers, these costs may be less than
the potential lost revenue if healthcare payers refuse coverage for such drugs
due to risk compensation concerns; moreover, the cost of warnings is less than
the potential cost of withdrawing such drugs from the marketplace due to
hazardous risk compensation effects.
In addition to FDA requirements, some may seek to impose on
manufacturers an independent duty to warn intermediaries and end users of
219hazardous risk compensation effects under products liability law. Although
this Article will not address the claim in detail, claimants litigating on this basis
may find it difficult to recover due to the burden of showing causation, or due
to defenses including assumption of risk, contributory negligence, or
obviousness of the risk.220 Given the likely limitations of litigation in this area,
FDA requirements will be the principal incentives for manufacturers to impose
warnings and take other actions to encourage safer behavior by users. This Part
will conclude by examining the potential dangers of overwarning.
A. FDA Labeling
The primary way in which the FDA acts to influence user behavior is by
imposing labeling requirements on drug manufacturers. If risk compensation
has been observed in pre-approval or postmarketing studies, the FDA should
ensure that product labels warn intermediaries and consumers of these effects.
Manufacturers must amend labels with new warnings "as soon as there is
reasonable evidence of an association of a serious hazard with a drug. . . [even
219. This duty to warn encompasses both the duty to warn of product dangers, as well as the
duty to instruct consumers in appropriate product use. DAVID G. OWEN, PRODUCTS LIABILITY LAW 584
(2d ed. 2008).
220. These warnings will also be subject to ongoing debate over whether FDA-approved
labels preempt warning requirements that may be imposed by state products liability suits. See, e.g.,
PLIVA, Inc. v. Mensing, 131 S. Ct. 2567 (2011) at 2581 (finding that a brand-name drug manufacturer
is subject to both state and federal law for warning labels, but that a generic drug manufacturer need
only comply with the FDA-required label); Elizabeth J. Cabraser, When Worlds Collide: The Supreme
Court Confronts Federal Agencies with Federalism in Wyeth v. Levine, 84 TUL. L. REV. 1275, 1281
(2010) (noting that currently state tort claims, including warning defects, are currently preempted for
medical devices, but not for drugs).
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if a] causal relationship between the serious hazard and the drug has not been
proven." 221
1. Labels Designed for Intermediaries
The FDA requires several different categories of labeling requirements for
prescribing intermediaries. The categories most relevant for risk
compensation behavior include "Indications and Usage," "Contraindications,"
"Warnings and Precautions," and "Patient Counseling Information."223
Warning may not be necessary in all of these sections; however, information
about hazardous and uninformed risk compensation effects should be included
in at least one section.
According to FDA regulations, the "Indications and Usage" section must
denote whether "a drug is used for an indication only in conjunction with a
primary mode of therapy (e.g., diet. . . [or] behavior changes ... )," as well as
whether "specific conditions . . . should be met before the drug is used on a
long term basis."a If risk compensation is observed, the FDA could consider
labeling requirements that indicate that a drug should only be used "in
conjunction" with counseling to mitigate increases in risk behavior.225 If
hazardous risk compensation effects have been observed, the label could
specify that a user should demonstrate an ability or commitment to avoid
increased risk-taking behavior before a drug is prescribed for long-term use.226
The "Contraindications" section "must describe any situations in which
the drug should not be used because the risk of use clearly outweighs any
possible therapeutic benefit," including when users "have a substantial risk of
being harmed by the drug and for whom no potential benefit makes the risk
acceptable." 227 This may be a logical place to include dangers associated with
uninformed overcompensation behavior, and particularly to note that patients
who increase their risk-taking beyond the drug's benefit are at a substantial risk
of harm. Whether the benefits of increased risk-taking make the risks
"[un]acceptable" is a value judgment, and disagreement on this point could
suggest that the warning belongs in another section.
221. 21 C.F.R. § 201.57(e) (2011).
222. See id. § 201.56(d)(1).
223. Id. The "Use in Specific Populations" category is largely used for warnings related to
drug abuse. Id. § 201.57(c)(10)(ii) (2011). It is unlikely that risk compensation behavior could be
classified in this way.
224. Id. § 201.57(c)(2)(i)(A).
225. This could be changed to the requirement that patients engage in safer behaviors (rather
than simply receive behavioral counseling), but this would undermine patients' freedom to make
decisions about the allocation of risk and the protection surplus.
226. There are of course limitations here: patients' motivations to engage in risky behaviors
will likely change over time, and they may not report behaviors accurately to physicians.




The "Warnings and Precautions" section is another logical place for
warnings about risk compensation behavior. This section "must describe
clinically significant adverse reactions[,] . .. other potential safety hazards[,] . .
. limitations in use imposed by them[,] . . . steps that should be taken if they
occur ... [and] any special care to be exercised by the practitioner for safe and
effective use."228  Because risk compensation behavior itself is non-
pharmacological, it may not fall under the definition of "adverse reaction."2
However, the biomedical consequences of risk compensation could fall under
this category, if the FDA identifies these as either adverse events caused by the
drug (through risk compensation) or "potential safety hazards." The label's
description of monitoring requirements or special care precautions could also
include the need to ask patients about their continuing risk behaviors during
drug use.
Finally the "Patient Counseling Information" may be the most important
and appropriate place to address hazardous and uninformed risk compensation
effects. The FDA specifies that this section must "contain information
necessary for patients to use the drug safely and effectively," as well as reprint
the full text of "[a]ny FDA-approved patient labeling." 230 This is a natural place
for a manufacturer to advise intermediaries to counsel patients about risk
compensation behavior and its potentially hazardous effects, and the FDA
should require language to this effect.
The recent labels approved for Truvada as PrEP have already incorporated
warnings aiming to ensure that PrEP should be "only part of a comprehensive
prevention strategy . . . and that other preventive measures should also be
used."231 In the "Indication and Prescribing Considerations" section, the label
states that the provider must "only prescribe TRUVADA as part of a
comprehensive prevention strategy."232 In "Warnings and Precautions," the
label further emphasizes that "Truvada . . . should be used only as part of a
comprehensive prevention strategy that includes other prevention measures,
such as safer sex practices. . . . Counsel uninfected individuals at high risk
about safer sex practices, including: Using condoms consistently and correctly.
... 233 Although these statements do not specifically warn that patients using
228. Id. § 201.57(c)(6)(i)-(ii).
229. Id. § 201,57(c)(7) (defining an adverse reaction as "an undesirable effect, reasonably
associated with use of a drug, that may occur as part of the pharmacological action of the drug or may be
unpredictable in its occurrence .. . for which there is some basis to believe there is a causal relationship
between the drug and the occurrence of the adverse event").
230. Id. § 201.57(c)(1 8).
231. Gilead Sciences, Inc., Risk Evaluation and Mitigation Strategy 1, July 16, 2012, available
at http://www.fda.gov/downloads/Drugs/DrugSafety/PostmarketDrugSafetyInformationforPatients
andProviders/UCM312304.pdf.
232. Important Safety Information About TRUVADA for a Pre-exposure Prophylaxis (PrEP)
Indication, in Gilead Sciences, supra note 231, at *21.
233. Id. at *22.
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PrEP may take more behavioral risks, they do suggest that counseling to avoid
this possibility is warranted.
2. Labels Designed for Patients
FDA regulations also require manufacturers to warn patients directly of
risks in a Medication Guide when "it is necessary to patients' safe and effective
use of drug products."234 The FDA makes this determination on a case-by-case
235basis in writing,23 but regulations note that the FDA will require a Guide under
the following conditions:
(1) The drug product is one for which patient labeling could help prevent serious adverse
effects . .. (2) The drug product is one that has serious risk(s) (relative to benefits) of which
patients should be made aware because information concerning the risk(s) could affect
patients' decision to use, or to continue to use, the product ... [and] (3) The drug product is
important to health and patient adherence to directions for use is crucial to the drug's
effectiveness.236
Where risk compensation behavior is observed in pre-approval or post-
approval studies, the FDA should require that any adverse effects and
instructions to avoid risk compensation be included in a Medication Guide.
Like warnings for intermediaries, Medication Guides for patients must
also provide warnings under specified headings. The most relevant headings for
this discussion are "What is the most important information I should know
about (name of drug)?", 23 7 "How should I take (name of drug)?", 238 and "What
should I avoid while taking (name of drug)?"2 39 Under "What is the most
important information," a Guide must state "the particular serious and
significant public health concern that has created the need for the Medication
Guide," along with "what the patient should do or consider because of that
concern, such as, weighing particular risks against the benefits of the drug,
avoiding particular behaviors (e.g., activities, drugs) . . . or engaging in
particular behaviors." 240 Where risk compensation has been observed, a
Medication Guide should highlight this risk, counsel patients to take note of the
adverse effects attributable to behavior change, advise patients to avoid taking
more risks, and encourage patients to engage in safer behaviors.
234. 21 C.F.R. § 208.1(b) (2011). A Medication Guide is an FDA-approved written label
intended to inform patients directly about drugs that pose "a serious and significant public health
concern." Id. § 208.1(a). These Guides are generally intended for drugs used in outpatient settings. Id.
235. See id. § 208.1(b).
236. Id. § 208.1(c)(l)-(3).
237. Id. § 208.20(b)(2).
238. Id. § 208.20(b)(5).
239. Id. § 208.20(b)(6). Because most consumers likely associate "side effects" with
pharmacological rather than behavioral mechanisms, this discussion omits the heading "What are the
possible or reasonably likely side effects of (name of drug)?" Id. § 208.20(b)(7).




In the "How should I take (name of drug)?" section, the FDA requires "a
statement describing any special instructions on how to administer the drug
product, if they are important to the drug's safety or effectiveness." 24 1 This is
another natural place to warn of hazardous and uninformed risk compensation
effects, as avoiding risk compensation will enable users to maximize the
effectiveness of the drug.
Finally, labeling may do most to encourage users to avoid risk
compensation behaviors under the heading "What should I avoid while taking
(name of drug)?", which includes "statements of specific, important
precautions patients should take to ensure proper use of the drug, including ...
[a] statement that identifies activities . . . that patients should avoid when using
the medication." 242 This would be a natural place for the FDA to require a short
statement instructing patients to avoid taking more behavioral risks as a
consequence of product use.
Again, FDA-approved labeling of Truvada as PrEP is instructive. In the
Medication Guide for patients, the manufacturer warns that "Just taking
TRUVADA may not keep you from getting HIV . . . You must still practice
safer sex at all times. Do not have any kind of sex without protection. Always
practice safer sex by using a latex or polyurethane condom . . . You must also
use other prevention methods to keep from getting HIV."243 This is reiterated in
the package insert, which alerts users to "still practice safer sex at all times"
and "use other methods to keep from getting HIV- 1. ,,24 This labeling does not
specifically state the possibility of increases in risk behavior among PrEP users,
but it does seek to minimize risk compensation effects.
3. Severity of Risk Compensation Should Influence Labeling
The severity of hazardous risk compensation effects as observed in
clinical studies should factor into FDA decisions about the placement and
strength of warnings. Risk compensation effects may not always be sufficiently
serious to merit warning prescribers and users. The placement of information
about risk compensation in a drug label should depend on the extent and
severity of the effects that are empirically documented in clinical research. One
scholar has described ways in which the FDA classifies risks for prescription
drugs into different labeling categories: "Contraindications" include risks that
"clearly outweigh any possible benefit;" "Rare adverse reactions" include
"non-serious side effects that occur with a frequency of less than one in a
thousand;" and "Warnings" include "risks that are more serious than adverse
reactions but are not so serious as to clearly outweigh possible benefits of a
241. Id. § 208.20(b)(5)(ii).
242. Id. § 208.20(b)(6).
243. Gilead Sciences, supra note 231, at *40.
244. Id. at *28.
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drug." 24 5 Beyond this scheme, FDA-required boxed warnings also indicate
"certain contraindications or serious warnings, particularly those that may lead
to death or serious injury."2 46 Following this guidance, only uninformed
overcompensation appears serious enough to be listed immediately as a
Contraindication, and it may not be sufficiently serious to qualify for a boxed
warning. The FDA should consider on a case-by-case basis whether other
forms of risk compensation pose a sufficiently serious threat to merit warnings
in other sections.
In their current form, admittedly, Medication Guides are far from a perfect
solution for influencing users' behaviors. Analyses of FDA-approved Guides
have consistently identified limitations on their effectiveness. For example,
several studies have found that Medication Guides have a relatively high mean
reading level of 10-12th grade, and further analyses have found that most are
unsuitable for use with adults of low literacy. 24 7 Studies assessing patient
comprehension and memory of Guide information are likewise disappointing; a
recent study examined comprehension among adults of varying literacy levels,
finding limited comprehension in every subgroup.248 These limitations,
however, may indicate failures in the creation of Guides that are appealing and
informative, rather than a failure of the strategy itself; one recent study found
that exposure to a Guide may indeed contribute to knowledge about medication
risks and usage.249 Additional research is necessary to understand how to craft
Medication Guides of maximal efficacy.
B. REMS Plans
Before the Food and Drug Administration Amendments Act (FDAAA)
took effect in 2008, manufacturers of products that posed risks to some classes
of patients entered voluntary agreements with the FDA to implement risk
management plans (RiskMAPs). 2 50 These efforts to modify user behavior and
245. Lars Noah, The Imperative To Warn: Disentangling the "Right To Know" from the
"Need To Know" About Consumer Product Hazards, 11 YALE J. ON REG. 293, 327-28 (1994).
246. 21 C.F.R. § 501.57(c)(1) (2012).
247. Michael S. Wolf et al., A Critical Review of FDA-Approved Medication Guides, 62
PATIENT EDUC. & COUNSELING 316 (2006) (identifying problems with the reading level and scope of 40
currently-approved Medication Guides); Michael S. Wolf et al., Usability ofFDA-Approved Medication
Guides, 27 J. GEN. INTERNAL MED. 1714 (2012) (analyzing 185 Medication Guides to show that they
fall below acceptable standards of accessibility); see also William S. Shrank & Jerry Avon, Educating
Patients About Their Medications: The Potential and Limitations of Written Drug Information, 26
HEALTH AFF. 731 (2007) (reviewing research on the deficiencies of written drug information).
248. Wolf, Usability, supra note 247.
249. Louis A. Morris, Morris S. Whitcup & Keith LaMattina, Failure To Communicate:
Medication Guide or Memory? 45 DRUG INFO. J. 775 (2001) (finding that knowledge of nonsteroidal
anti-inflammatory drug risks was best among participants who had just read the Medication Guide and
worst among participants with no exposure to the Guide).
250. Food and Drug Administration Amendments Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-85, § 901(b),




limit product access included warnings to intermediaries, restricting the channel
of distribution, limiting refills, limiting prescribing authority to physicians with
certain qualifications, or requiring mandatory educational programs for
physicians and patients.25 1 Since 2008, the FDAAA has provided the agency
with authority to require that any drug manufacturer present a Risk Evaluation
and Mitigation Strategy (REMS) as part of the drug approval process. In
addition, the FDA may also mandate that manufacturers revise REMS plans as
needed after approval to ensure that drug benefits outweigh drug risks.252 When
a REMS exists, sales of the drug are prohibited without compliance with the
REMS.253 As of January 2013, the FDA website listed active REMS approved
for 72 individual drugs and 4 categories of drugs; an additional 132 drugs had
been released from a REMS. REMS requirements can also include
mandatory efforts to influence user behavior, primarily through requiring
manufacturers to provide additional information and training about drug risks.
Through a REMS, the FDA can require manufacturers to take actions such as
disseminating revised Medication Guides and package inserts, sending letters to
health care providers, publicizing the REMS to health care providers,
disseminating information about serious drug risks through health care
professional societies, and training health care providers. 2 55 The FDA can also
require certification of pharmacies distributing the drugs, as well as patient
monitoring and registration.256 The FDA requires manufacturers to submit
assessments of the REMS at specified time periods to evaluate whether the
strategy meets its stated goals, and to allow opportunity for modification.257
Life with a REMS: Challenges and Opportunities, 13 J. HEALTH CARE L. & POL'Y 269, 269 (2010)
(describing the difference between voluntary RiskMAPs and mandatory REMS).
251. See Gilhooley, supra note 275, at 938-45.
252. Food and Drug Administration Amendments Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-85, § 901(b),
121 Stat. 823, 926 (2007) (codified at 21 U.S.C. § 355-1(g)). The Secretary may impose a REMS
requirement based on factors including the size of the population likely to use the drug, the seriousness
of the disease to be treated, the expected benefits of the drug, and the seriousness of any known or
potential adverse events that may be related to the drug. Food and Drug Administration Amendments
Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-85, § 901(b), 121 Stat. 823, 926 (2007). "New safety information" that can
prompt a review and revision of a REMS can include adverse event reports and postapproval studies. Id.
121 Stat. at 926-27.
253. 21 U.S.C. § 355(p)(1). See also David A. Kessler & David C. Vladeck, A Critical
Examination of the FDA's Efforts to Preempt Failure-To-Warn Claims, 96 GEo. L.J. 461, 491 n.144
(2008) ("The goal of the REMS is to detect serous risks with drugs as quickly as possible and to permit
the FDA to respond with appropriate measures, including, when necessary, withdrawal of approval.").
254. See FDA, Approved Risk Evaluation and Mitigation Strategies, http://www.fda.gov/
Drugs/DrugSafety/PostmarketDrugSafetylnformationforPatientsandProviders/ucml 11350.htm (last
visited Jan. 21, 2013).
255. Food and Drug Administration Amendments Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-85, § 90 1(b),
121 Stat. 823, 929-32 (2007).
256. Id.
257. 21 U.S.C. § 355-1(d) (denoting timetable for assessments); 21 U.S.C. § 355-1 (g)-(h)
(describing procedures for assessments and modifications).
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When a manufacturer does not follow a REMS, the FDA may impose penalties
including civil sanctions, seizure of the drug, and the withdrawal of approval.258
Where hazardous risk compensation effects are observed and deemed to
be sufficiently serious, the FDA should address these effects through REMS
requirements. Of particular interest in these plans may be the training of health
care providers to provide behavioral counseling and monitoring of behavioral
risk-taking, as well as certification of pharmacies to reinforce these warnings at
the time of prescription. Patients could be registered and regularly surveyed
about their behaviors, which may not only increase information about risk
compensation effects, but also serve as an intervention to remind users about
their behavioral risks.259 The combination of REMS elements for a given drug
will depend on the context and behaviors, but the REMS provides multiple
options for intervention.
Under the REMS for Truvada as PrEP, the manufacturer must address risk
compensation behavior in several ways.260 These include providing an online
training course for prescribers, disseminating information and safety fact sheets
to professional organizations, publishing safety information in pre-specified
clinical journals targeting prescribers, sending providers a "Dear Healthcare
Provider (DHCP) letter" with the Prescribing Information and Medication
Guide, providing materials for prescribers to use in educating patients,
providing an Agreement Form for prescribers and patients to sign before and
during PrEP use (which confirms that the patient understands that Truvada
must be part of "a complete prevention strategy" that includes "always
practicing safer sex by using condoms correctly" 261), providing prescribers with
a checklist for counseling patients, and posting all provider information and
training materials online as a Program Kit available at least 3 years after
approval. These strategies provide an example of the options for addressing risk
compensation effects through REMS requirements, and suggest that the FDA
would be open to addressing these risks for other types of medications.
258. See Bragg & Florence, supra note 250, at 270 ("[A] manufacturer's failure to comply
with a requirement of an approved REMS may subject a responsible person to criminal sanctions as well
as significant civil monetary penalties."); Barbara J. Evans, Seven Pillars of a New Evidentiary
Paradigm: The Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act Enters the Genomic Era, 85 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 419,
521-22 (2010) ("The drug can be deemed misbranded, which allows FDA to pursue various sanctions
against the manufacturer including seizure of the drug."); Cory Fox, Resisting Antibiotic Resistance:
Legal Strategies To Maintain Man's Dominion over Microbes, 12 HOuS. J. HEALTH L. & POL'Y 35, 58
(2011) ("The FDA may also use a REMS restriction to. .. withdraw the approval of existing drugs.").
259. One helpful strategy may be "motivational interviewing," in which an interviewer
encourages risk-reduction behaviors by identifying and resolving patients' ambivalence about behavioral
changes. See Eileen Britt, Stephen M. Hudson & Neville M. Blampied, Motivational Interviewing and
Health Settings: A Review, 53 PATIENT EDUC. & COUNSELING 147, 147 (2004).
260. Gilead Sciences, supra note 231, at 2-6.




C. Overwarning and Public Policy Concerns
This Article's proposal to impose labeling requirements for risk
compensation effects has weaknesses. Overwarning is a concern for
prescription drugs for a number of reasons described above-for instance, the
concern that too many warnings will deter the use of helpful products, cause
consumers to disregard important risks,262 subject consumers to unreasonable
fears of harm,263 and lead to reduced use of beneficial drugs. Concerns about
overwarning have encouraged the FDA to reject certain categories of warning
information, such as warnings for off-label uses.264 These criticisms are well-
265founded, and the hazards of overwarning are legitimate. Required warnings
also impose costs on manufacturers (which may be passed on to consumers and
healthcare payers).
In addition to the concern of overwarning, there may be some worry that
locating the duty to warn exclusively with manufacturers may chill the
development of other interventions to address risk compensation behavior, such
as counseling. For instance, if products that may give rise to risk compensation
are equipped with labels discussing this risk, there may be less motivation for
providers, clinical staff, pharmacists, and health educators to develop strategies
to encourage healthier behaviors among drug consumers. Because these other
strategies may be better tailored to individual behaviors or local risk factors,
replacing these efforts with general product warnings may paradoxically
undermine opportunities to address risk compensation effects more effectively.
Another fear of requiring warnings for risk compensation behavior is that
warnings will exacerbate opposition to making drugs more accessible,
regardless of whether this opposition is grounded in evidence for a particular
group of patients. The HPV vaccine is an example of an intervention that has
sparked widespread resistance due to fears of risk compensation behavior.
Parents have reported concern that adolescent girls who receive the HPV
262. Noah, supra note 245.
263. See, e.g., David G. Owen, Dangers in Prescription Drugs: Filling a Private Law Gap in
the Healthcare Debate, 42 CoNN. L. REV. 733 (2010) (suggesting that manufacturers' duties to warn
consumers of the risks of birth control pills had contributed to unreasonable fears of pill use).
264. See Lars Noah, Platitudes About 'Product Stewardship' in Torts: Continuing Drug
Research and Education, 15 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REv. 359, 370-71 & nn.46-51 (2009).
Professor Lars Noah has argued that the FDA "would never tolerate" some of the information that other
scholars have recommended as additions to warning labels. Id. at 370.
265. See id. at 376 & n.71 (citing scholarship and court cases critical of overwarning); William
Funk, Judicial Deference and Regulatory Preemption by Federal Agencies, 84 TUL. L. REV. 1233, 1250
(noting that overwarning "could result in the warnings losing their significance . . . [or] in patients being
dissuaded from taking the drugs when it would be in their best interest to take them"); Allen Rostron,
Prescription for Fairness: A New Approach to Tort Liability of Brand-Name and Generic Drug
Manufacturers, 60 DUKE L.J. 1123, 1191 (2011) ("Overwaming about every imaginable risk may drive
doctors and patients to overlook truly significant precautionary information, deter doctors from
prescribing worthwhile drugs, or scare patients out of taking drugs that would benefit them. These risks
are real.").
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vaccine will engage in more sexual activity,266 and some adolescents have
reported similar concerns about hypothetical vaccines for HIV.267 The evidence
regarding whether warnings in fact do shape consumer behavior is mixed.268
Wilde points out that warnings must be mindful of reactance-the possibility
that overwarning may in fact stimulate riskier behaviors if it is perceived to be
coercive.269 Warning may also stimulate riskier behavior among people with a
high preference for risk (e.g., sensation-seeking behavior); however, this group
may be less interested in using safety measures altogether. 270 If warnings fail to
change behavior, but instead succeed in providing ammunition to groups
seeking to prevent access to users who would otherwise benefit, they may do
more harm than good.
These concerns do not seem fatal to the overall project of acknowledging
risk compensation behavior in the testing, labeling, and marketing of
prescription drugs. Although the FDA should judge the risks of overwarning on
a case-by-case basis for each product, few consumers are likely to be deterred
from product use due to the fear that they will be unable to control their own
behavior. Warnings do impose costs on manufacturers, but these may be less
than the possible costs of warning defect litigation if warnings are not
provided-particularly when risk compensation effects have been noted in the
scientific literature or in product trials. Moreover, if warnings lead users to
avoid increased risk-taking, they will help to maximize product effectiveness,
which can appeal to healthcare payers. Even if warnings are too blunt a tool to
reduce risk compensation behavior, they would be a first step in addressing the
behavioral effects that undermine the efficacy of health and safety
interventions.
It is unknown whether FDA-required warnings would supplant other
strategies to influence users' risk-taking. If drug labels bear warnings about risk
compensation behavior, will they deter prescribers from counseling patients
directly about their risk-taking? In the absence of empirical evidence, this fear
seems ill-founded. Instead, warnings can alert prescribers that risk
compensation is possible, and validate concerns among providers who had
already considered risk compensation effects. By bringing risk compensation to
providers' attention, the warnings may instead encourage more behavioral
counseling at the time of prescription, and more development of interventions
that reduce risk-taking. If warnings exacerbate calls to restrict product access,
266. See, e.g., Loretta Brabin et al., Future Acceptance of Adolescent Human Papillomavirus
Vaccination: A Survey of Parental Attitudes, 24 VACCINE 3087, 3092 (2006); Kahan et al., supra note
47; Marlow et al., supra note 52.
267. Patrick M. Webb et al., HIV Immunization: Acceptability and Anticipated Effects on
Sexual Behavior Among Adolescents, 25 J. ADOLESCENT HEALTH 320 (1999).
268. Jennifer J. Argo & Kelley J. Main, Meta-Analyses ofthe Effectiveness of Warning Labels,
23 J. PUB. POL'Y & MARKETING 193 (2004).
269. See WILDE, supra note 21, at 199-202.




this could be a detrimental public policy outcome. But this Article has only
suggested that warnings are appropriate when risk compensation behavior is
actually observed in empirical studies, which will limit warnings in cases
where disclosure does more harm than good.
V. Limiting Prescription Drug Availability: FDA Approval and Access
Restrictions
New drugs must receive FDA approval before sale in interstate
commerce.27 1 One of the FDA's primary roles is "to help ensure that only drugs
that, on balance, are beneficial to some class of patients ever reach the
healthcare market."272 Because prescription drugs pose both greater benefits
and greater risks to life and health than other product categories, the FDA's
regulatory wer exceeds that of other agencies designed to regulate consumer
products. The FDA's determination of drug safety is based on the three
phases of evidence collection discussed above.2  Drawing on this evidence, the
Secretary may deny drug approval of a new drug if testing is not "adequate by
all methods reasonably applicable to show whether or not such drug is safe for
use" or if it discloses that the drug is actually unsafe. The Secretary may also
withdraw approval of an existing drug if postmarketing data show that the drug
is unsafe for use or if there is "a lack of substantial evidence that the drug will
have the effect it purports or is represented to have."276
271. See Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, Pub. L. No. 717, § 505(a), 52 Stat. 1040,
1052 (1938) (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. § 355(a)); see also Katrice Bridges Copeland, Enforcing
Integrity, 87 IND. L.J. 1033, 1039 (2012) ("The Federal Food Drug and Cosmetic Act (FDCA) and the
FDA's implementing regulations generally prohibit manufacturers of new drugs from distributing
products in interstate commerce for any "intended use" that the FDA has not approved as safe and
effective or, in the case of generic drugs, cleared through a substantial equivalence determination.")
272. Owen, supra note 263, at 741.
273. Id.; see also OWEN, supra note 219, at 568 ("All prescription drugs ... possess
substantial costs as well as benefits. This is because most drug hazards are inherent and unavoidable.").
274. See supra Subection I.B.1; 21 U.S.C. § 355(b) (requiring as part of a new drug
application "full reports of investigations which have been made to show whether or not such drug is
safe for use and whether such drug is effective in use"); 21 C.F.R. § 314.105 (2011) ("FDA will approve
an application after it determines that the drug meets the statutory standards for safety and effectiveness
. . . ."); id. § 314.50(d)(5) (listing the clinical data that must be included in a new drug application). The
information required in a new drug application does not include any language specifically requesting
data on the behavior of research participants. Without changes to this language, behavioral data could
still be sought under the general provision of "any other data or information relevant to the evaluation of
the safety and effectiveness of the drug product," or under the category of drug "abuse" ("a description
and analysis of studies or information related to abuse of the drug"). See 21 C.F.R. §§ 314.50(d)(5)(iv),
314.50(d)(5)(vii).
275. 21 U.S.C. § 355(d). For a summary of FDA approval processes, see also Margaret
Gilhooley, When Drugs Are Safe for Some But Not Others: The FDA Experience and Alternatives for
Products Liability, 36 HOUs. L. REv. 927, 938-39 (1999) (providing a brief overview of FDA approval
and labeling).
276. 21 U.S.C. § 355(e). Another means of limiting access to health and safety products after
approval is through products liability litigation, specifically through claiming that a product is defective
in design. A judicial finding that a product contains a design defect will ordinarily result in eliminating
the entire product line and ending consumer access. OWEN, supra note 219, at 499. Generally, courts do
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Evidence of risk compensation effects can inform FDA decisions about
whether and how a drug should be available to consumers. When evidence of
risk compensation is used in legal decisions about drug availability, however, it
is crucial to weigh the value of drug access against the type and extent of
hazardous risk compensation effects. This Part will consider approval and
access restrictions under three conditions: when perfectly informed or
uninformed partial risk compensation is observed, when hazardous risk
compensation is observed, and when hazardous risk compensation is observed
and cannot be reduced through mechanisms such as labeling and provider
education or restricted access.
A. When Perfectly Informed or Uninformed Partial Risk Compensation Is
Observed
Risk compensation effects alone should not prompt FDA rejection or
withdrawal of a drug if these behaviors do not create hazards-that is, when
users and third parties do not experience an increased risk of harm relative to
baseline. As described above, risk compensation behavior should be presumed
rational, even it if completely offsets a drug's benefits, because it can result in a
net benefit for the users of pharmaceutical products. 27 7 Although this type of
offsetting behavior poses a problem for healthcare payers in the form of
reduced cost-effectiveness, cost-effectiveness is not a consideration in FDA
approval. 2 78 This is not to say that the FDA should do nothing about perfectly
informed or uninformed partial risk compensation effects-efforts to diminish
risk compensation, such as warnings to educate intermediaries and users, may
yet be helpful. As noted, where risk compensation is observed in clinical
studies before drug approval, the FDA could qualify drug approval by
requesting a postmarketing study to monitor for future hazardous effects.279 But
where it does not create harms relative to baseline, risk compensation behavior
should not be the basis for refusing drug approval.
not rule on the merits of design defect claims for prescription drugs, and a claim of design defect based
on risk compensation effects may be unlikely to succeed. See id. at 37.
277. See Section II.A. In the case of perfect offsetting behavior, however, the FDA may
determine that the drug's benefits (permitting increased risk-taking) do not outweigh the risks of side
effects.
278. See Asha S. Geire, Price Wars and Patent Law: Reducing the Cost of Health Care
Through Medical Device Price Transparency, 12 TUL. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 239, 255 (2009) ("In
fact, it is said that if a device company sought approval for a $1 million 'gold-plated billiard stent' that
functions as it should, the FDA must approve it even if a $127 version of the same stent is already
available in the market.") (citing Richard A. Deyo, Gaps, Tensions, and Conflicts in the FDA Approval
Process: Implications for Clinical Practice, 17 J. AM. BOARD FAM. PRAC. 142 (2004)).




B. When Hazardous Risk Compensation Is Observed
Where hazardous risk compensation effects are observed, either before or
after drug approval, decisions about approval will be more complex. As before,
hazardous risk compensation consists of uninformed overcompensation and any
risk compensation that results in externalized harms. Because users' risk
perceptions and motivations to engage in risk behavior will vary, some users
will likely not engage in hazardous behavior. These users would derive benefit
from the drug without harming others. However, others might engage in
hazardous behavior-and at the extreme, the drug may cause net harm at the
population level. When hazardous risk compensation effects are detected, or
even suggested, during premarketing testing, the FDA should not bar approval
outright. Instead, the agency should consider requiring additional studies to
identify individual and contextual factors associated with risk compensation
effects, potential strategies to predict and modify risk compensation behavior
among users, and the efficacy of warnings designed to minimize hazardous
behavior. With this information, the FDA should first respond by requiring
revisions to warnings for prescribers and consumers (where applicable), and
evaluate the effects of these mitigation strategies. Where warning and
counseling patients reduces hazards, the FDA should not restrict product
access, but rather should continue to enforce product labeling, provider
education, and other elements of the REMS. This maximizes the availability of
beneficial drugs, which is a central goal of the FDA approval process.
If hazardous risk compensation persists among users after warnings and
other REMS provisions are added, the FDA response should depend on the
type of harm, the extent of harm, and distribution of harm among users and
nonusers. One option for an FDA response may be to limit drug access rather
than to withdraw the drug from the marketplace. This approach would avoid
penalizing consumers who do not engage in hazardous behavior. For this
purpose, hazardous risk compensation behaviors may be considered similar to
drug misuse or abuse-other uses contrary to product labeling. A drug's
potential for abuse may factor into drug approval decisions,280 but rather than
taking the restrictive step of withdrawing approval, the FDA may instead use
its authority to restrict approval and drug access to only the class of patients
who will benefit.28 1 Elements of a REMS can include strategies designed to
limit product access, such as informing health providers which types of patients
should receive drugs, imposing controls to assure training of health care
providers, certifying pharmacies, narrowing the class of patients who may
280. See I Food and Drug Administration § 13:75 (2010) (noting the FDA's definition of
"safety" for over-the-counter drugs: "Safety means a low incidence of adverse reactions or significant
side effects under adequate directions of use and warnings against unsafe use as well as low potential for
harm which may result from abuse under conditions of widespread availability.").
281. See, e.g., Gilhooley, supra note 275, at 938-45 (discussing FDA actions to reduce the
likelihood that physicians will prescribe drugs to patients likely to experience harm).
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receive the drugs and the settings in which they receive them, and monitoring
282and registering patients. In the risk compensation context, it is highly
problematic to presume that we can predict ex ante which patients (or classes of
patients) are likely to adjust their risk behaviors in response to a prescription
drug. Existing data are sparse, and even a predictive model with high accuracy
would run the risk of misidentifying patients who would not have increased
their risk-taking. Instead, it may be more appropriate to rely on physicians to
periodically assess users' behaviors after prescribing beneficial drugs, and to
consider whether a drug is still clinically indicated for a user who reports large
increases in risk behavior that are not responsive to counseling. 283
An FDA decision to limit product access would not be without problems.
Selectively restricting drug access to a subset of patients based on predictions
of behavior is problematic due to problems detecting risk compensation in
individual users, 284 as well as concerns about fairness and abuses of discretion
in limiting access. All patients who take the drug may well receive a
pharmacological benefit-the drug could "work" for everyone, despite whether
some patients reverse those effects by overcompensating. Even if FDA
decisions could be tailored to approve drugs for only some patients, these drugs
could still be prescribed off-label to others. 285 Finally, denying drugs to a subset
of patients implies that they will always behave hazardously, neglecting the
extent to which risk perception, motivations, and behaviors may change over
time. These factors should be part of FDA decisions on selective approval due
to hazardous risk compensation effects.
C. When Hazardous Risk Compensation Cannot Be Reduced
At the extreme, it may be impossible to reduce hazardous risk
compensation effects through warning and REMS plans, and in the most
exceptional circumstances, population-level data may suggest that a drug's risk
compensation hazards outweigh its benefits. This scenario would be truly
extraordinary, and it would require a heavy burden of proof to show that a drug
causes net harm in real-world settings. To provoke withdrawal of the drug from
the marketplace in this extreme case, the population-level harms posed by risk
compensation behavior must be so severe as to pose an "imminent hazard to
282. Food and Drug Administration Amendments Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-85, § 901(b),
121 Stat. 823, 929-32 (2007) (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. § 355-1).
283. This strategy is still limited because it relies on accurate self-reporting of behaviors by
users. It also raises the question of whether patients are increasing their risk behavior due to risk
compensation or another circumstance, such as a change in the underlying target risk level. Furthermore,
it will require judgment (which is vulnerable to discrimination), including judgment regarding
participants who exhibited risk compensation once, but now want to resume taking the drugs.
284. See discussion supra Subsection II.D.3.
285. Off-label prescription is legal in the US, and Noah has noted empirical evidence to show
"that package inserts often fail to ensure rational prescribing." Noah, supra note 264, at 385 (2009).
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public health."286 If the evidence on hazardous compensation supports this
finding (which is unlikely), the Secretary may reject or withdraw approval of a
drug entirely,287 even though recalling an approved drug from the market is
both difficult and rare.288 A withdrawal of drug approval on this basis would be
a major shift in FDA policy, given that uses contrary to label warnings are
generally not part of safety considerations for drugs that are not also classified
as controlled substances.289 These drugs would remain safe for use as labeled,
but unsafe for users who do not follow the warnings to avoid increased risk-
taking. In order for the FDA to evaluate drug approval on the basis of uses that
contravene product warnings, the agency would bear the burden of
demonstrating "a reasonable possibility of misuse," as decided in a 1978
administrative ruling.290 The FDA would therefore need to demonstrate the
extent and severity of harm posed by hazardous risk compensation behavior.
The procedure for withdrawing approval would be complex, including due
notice and an opportunity for a hearing.291
One scholar has also pointed out that the FDA's power to withdraw a
product or control its distribution out of a concern for drug abuse, or other user
behaviors, may be challenged by American Pharmaceutical Ass'n v.
Mathews.292 This D.C. Circuit decision concerned the FDA's regulation of
methadone, which was also a controlled substance under the authority of the
Justice Department. In light of evidence documenting methadone abuse, the
FDA sought to restrict the distribution of methadone to specified outlets,
thereby barring most "community pharmacies" from drug distribution.2 93 The
lower court found, and the D.C. Circuit agreed, that while the FDA has
"primary responsibility" for initial drug approval, drugs that are controlled
substances are subsequently under the jurisdiction of the Justice Department;
the FDA lacked authority to restrict drug distribution out of concern for
286. 21 U.S.C. § 355(e).
287. Id. § 355(e); see also Gilhooley, supra note 275, at 940 (citing Legal Status of Approved
Labeling for Prescription Drugs, 37 Fed. Reg. 16,503, 16,504 (Aug. 15, 1972) (specifying conditions
under which the FDA may take this action)).
288. See Daniel R. Cahoy, Medical Product Information Incentives and the Transparency
Paradox, 82 IND. L.J. 623, 668-69 (2007). Legislative proposals have suggested expanding the FDA's
recall authority. See Berman, supra note 208, at 67-68 (describing draft legislation proposed in 2010).
289. 1 Food and Drug Administration § 13:75 (2010).
290. See 1 Food and Drug Administration § 13:75 (2010) (citing Initial Decision, Benylin
Expectorant, Docket 76N-0483, slip op at *8 (FDA 1978) ("Consideration of safety evidence relating to
uses of a drug outside of the label requirements necessitates a showing that there is a reasonable
probability that such non-label indicated uses can be expected to occur.")).
291. See 21 U.S.C. § 355(e).
292. Gilhooley, supra note 275, at 941-42 (citing Am. Pharmaceutical Ass'n v. Mathews, 530
F.2d 1054 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (upholding Am. Pharmaceutical Ass'n v. Weinberger, 377 F. Supp. 824
(D.D.C. 1974))).
293. Am. Pharmaceutical Ass'n v. Weinberger, 377 F. Supp. 824, 825 (D.D.C. 1974). The
Mathews court affirmed on the basis of the Weinberger opinion. Am. Pharmaceutical Ass'n v. Mathews,
530 F.2d 1054, 1054 (1976).
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abuse.294 A subsequent case has interpreted Mathews to signify that the FDA
may only impose limitations based on a drug's "inherent safety ... only when
used for its intended purposes." 29 Under the Federal Food Drug and Cosmetic
Act, "safety" explicitly denotes "safe[ty] . . . under the conditions of use
prescribed, recommended, or suggested in the labeling or proposed labeling
thereof."296 It is important to acknowledge that FDA regulations do not specify
precisely what "safety" entails; the Supreme Court, however, has stated that
"safety" requires only that "the expected therapeutic gain justifies the risk
entailed by its use," making a drug "unsafe if its potential for inflicting death or
physical injury is not offset by the possibility of therapeutic benefit."297
Given these precedents, Mathews and subsequent rulings seem unlikely to
impede FDA regulation of drugs for which risk compensation is pervasive,
harmful, and unresponsive to other means of risk reduction. The drugs for
which risk compensation behavior is relevant, including the examples discussed
in this Article, are not controlled substances under the purview of another
administrative body. It is a murkier point to argue that risk compensation
influences a drug's "inherent" safety, but the phenomenon does indeed assume
that the drug is being used for its "intended purposes"-a user has selected the
drug for its potential to reduce risks, then subsequently divided the benefit
among risk-reduction and other priorities. But it may be most persuasive to
note that risk compensation behavior affects the balance between "therapeutic
gain" and "the risk entailed by its use," the precise calibration that, according to
the Supreme Court, determines whether a drug is "safe" for FDA purposes. On
this analysis, risk compensation that tips the balance from net benefit to harm,
and that cannot be limited through user education or other less intrusive means,
seems likely to fall within the purview of the FDA for a determination of drug
safety.
Risk compensation effects that pose so severe a danger as to be
"imminent[ly] hazardous to public health" are highly unlikely, and FDA
withdrawals of approval on this basis would face tremendous opposition. The
alternative responses discussed above-warnings, REMS provisions, and less
restrictive limitations on access-preserve maximal freedom for users who
294. Am. Pharmaceutical Ass'n v. Weinberger, 377 F. Supp. 824, at 830.
295. Ass'n Am. Physicians & Surgeons, Inc., v. U.S. Food & Drug Admin., 226 F. Supp. 2d
204, 217 (D.D.C. 2002) (emphasis added) (citing Am. Pharmaceutical Ass'n v. Weinberger, 377 F.
Supp. 824, 829 (D.D.C. 1974)) (finding that the FDA exceeded its authority by adopting the Pediatric
Rule, which required manufacturers to test drugs for pediatric patients and suggest pediatric doses, even
where drugs were solely intended for adult use).
296. 21 U.S.C. § 355(d); see also Ass'n Am. Physicians & Surgeons, 226 F. Supp. 2d, at 216-
17.
297. U.S. v. Rutherford, 442 U.S. 544, 555-56 (1979); see also Food and Drug Admin. v.
Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 121 (2000) ("[A]ny product regulated by the FDA
that remains on the market must be safe and effective for its intended use.. .. That is, the potential for




would receive a net benefit from drugs, while minimizing internalized and
externalized harms.
VI. Conclusion
This Article has argued that risk compensation behavior-increased
behavioral risk-taking based on the expectation that one is protected from
harm-is a measurable, presumptively rational, and potentially value-
maximizing response to the use of health and safety products. But despite the
benefits that individuals may gain from increases in risky behavior, risk
compensation behaviors may undermine the effectiveness of health and safety
interventions. At the extreme, behavioral adjustments can fully offset the
beneficial effects of health and safety products, undermine individual
preferences (uninformed partial risk compensation), expose the users of such
products to harm when they miscalculate (uninformed overcompensation), or
expose third parties to harm (externally hazardous risk compensation).
Although risk compensation behavior and its conceptual cognates have
received some attention in legal scholarship, the mechanism and adverse
consequences of risk compensation have received very little attention in FDA
regulation of prescription drugs.
This Article has attempted to remedy this neglect, noting that FDA law
provides useful tools to incentivize research into risk compensation effects, to
acknowledge risk compensation as a potential effect of drug use, and to attempt
to influence users' behaviors to obtain the maximum benefit from prescription
drugs. The FDA-required labeling and REMS requirements for Truvada as
PrEP may indicate that the agency is already concerned about risk
compensation effects, and the Truvada experience may provide lessons for a
more systematic approach to addressing user behaviors. The FDAAA has
expanded the authority of the FDA to require manufacturer-led postmarketing
studies and risk-reduction plans, and there is a firm public health justification to
use this authority to both investigate and address risk compensation effects.
Future work is needed in this field, including scholarship assessing ways to
improve the effectiveness of consumer warnings; clarifying the duties of
providers and intermediaries; exploring ways to encourage the development of
other types of risk-reduction strategies; and investigating the applicability of
risk compensation concepts in other areas of consumer protection, including
medical devices, safety technologies, direct regulation of risk behavior, and
financial products. This Article, however, has made a start in addressing risk
compensation effects in the prescription drug market. As we learn more about
risk perception and the context of individual health behaviors, legal reasoning
that incorporates these insights can play a key part in improving public health.
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